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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The resource allocations made today entail consequences for tomorrow. 
For example, the use of coal today preempts its use tomorrow. The 
environmental damages resulting from non-optimal use of resources such as 
air and water is a major concern in both developing and developed 
countries. Since the human life is shorter than many environmental cycles, 
people who are responsible for future environmental damages do not have to 
face the consequences of their actions today. But future generations do. 
The underlying reason for this exploitation lies in the incompleteness of 
markets for environmental quality and the fact that future generations 
cannot participate in today's market. A plausible solution to this problem 
is to impose a "fee" on excess pollution emissions and resource 
exploitation so that the social costs are internalized. Many such measures 
have been proposed over the decades. 
Although numerous control mechanisms have been promoted for 
controlling environmental pollution, they have met with limited success. 
One of the barriers to successful implementation is the information 
requirement associated with traditional control instruments. Instruments 
such as Pigouvian taxation and environmental bonds require information on 
the marginal damage costs imposed on society by individual firms, requiring 
monitoring of each firm. In addition, in the case of non-point source 
pollution, the fate and transport of pollutants must be carefully monitored 
and modelled. Thus, there is a need to consider alternative control 
mechanisms that can reduce the information requirements and still induce 
compliance with the environmental regulations. This dissertation explores 
three alternative incentive structures in terras of their effectiveness and 
practicality. 
While the dissertation is streamlined as three distinct papers, there 
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are a number of common threads running through the three incentive schemes 
discussed in this dissertation. First, many of the basic insights for all 
three topics are derived from the labor literature's analysis of shirking 
in the workplace. In the labor literature it is difficult to monitor each 
individual worker to observe his effort input towards production because 
monitoring costs are prohibitively expensive. Therefore, workers have an 
incentive to shirk to maximize their own welfare. The labor literature has 
come up with various alternatives to control labor shirking in the 
workplace. Likewise, in the environmental arena, it is difficult to 
monitor the effort put forth by each firm towards pollution control because 
monitoring costs are high. Therefore, the problem of shirking is common 
for both the labor and environmental arenas. Second, the three mechanisms 
discussed in this dissertation are considered in terms of their 
applicability to the control of non-point source pollution created by 
agriculture. The information requirement of each alternative mechanism in 
this context is a significant barrier to practical implementation. This 
dissertation examines the trade-off between the cost of collecting 
information to control pollution and the possibility of perfectly 
controlling environmental pollution. 
Paper I examines the limits to environmental bonds. Bonds have 
recently been promoted as an alternative tool for controlling environmental 
damages, particularly in those instances when the innovative activities of 
a firm have uncertain future impacts [Costanza and Perrings (1990)]. Under 
this mechanism, a firm would post a bond ex ante, forfeiting the bond if 
its activities caused harm to environmental resources. While the benefits 
of bonds have been developed, there has been little systematic effort to 
explore their limitations. The labor literature, in contrast, has 
extensively studied the limits to bonds as a mechanism for preventing 
worker shirking. Using insights found for this parallel problem, this 
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paper explores the limits to environmental bonds, focusing on the problems 
of moral hazard, liquidity constraints, and legal restrictions. Each limit 
offers a challenge to the success of environmental bonds. The paper 
identifies the conditions under which bonds may be successfully implemented 
using the real-world example of surface coal mining. The paper explores 
the use of bonds to resolve agricultural non-point source pollution 
problems as a motivating example. 
Paper II reconsiders the budget balancing random penalization method 
proposed by Xepapadeas (1991). This paper demonstrates that, contrary to 
Xepapadeas, the budget-balancing system of subsidies and random penalty 
cannot be used to induce compliance with the regulators' objectives if any 
firm within the system is risk neutral. The mechanism can be successfully 
applied, however, if firms are sufficiently risk averse (Rasmusen, 1987). 
The paper explores the optimal design of a random penalty mechanism. In 
particular, it is shown that the mechanism will be effective for a wider 
range of firms if the probability of receiving a fine and the fines 
themselves are differentiated according to the firm's risk aversion. The 
paper also demonstrates that an increase in number of firms has a negative 
effect on compliance. 
The problem with the random penalty mechanism is that the firm which 
is not responsible for excessive pollution might also get penalized when 
the ambient concentration exceeds the optimal level. Paper III considers a 
third instrument, the Rank Order Tournaments (ROTs), which provides a 
compromise between the complete monitoring need for bonds and absence of 
monitoring in the random penalization scheme. The ROT has been promoted in 
the labor literature to control shirking of labor under imperfect 
monitoring. In the case of environmental pollution, when perfect 
monitoring is prohibitively expensive, a partial monitoring, ranking firms 
on the basis of qualitative information on their level of investment in 
4 
pollution control, may significantly reduce implementation cost. A 
framework for an environmental ROTs is developed to compare the efficiency 
and information requirements associated with Pigouvian taxation and ROTs. 
The application to non-point source pollution in agriculture is also 
considered. 
Explanation of Dissertation Format 
This dissertation consists of three complete, self-contained papers. 
Each paper contains its own introduction, sections on theory and 
application, conclusions, and references. The general summary and the 
references cited in general introduction and general summary follow the 
third paper. 
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PAPER I. THE LIMITS TO ENVIRONMENTAL BONDS: 
THE LESSONS FROM THE LABOR LITERATURE 
6 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider this situation: You hire a worker to work around your yard 
for $2.00 per hour. At this wage, and given the worker's disutility from 
expending effort, he has an incentive to shirk on the job. He would prefer 
wasting time doing unproductive activities like sleeping under a tree 
because you cannot perfectly monitor his actions. The worst that can 
happen is that he gets fired and has to find new employment at this low 
wage. The question you must answer is how can you discipline the worker to 
prevent shirking. What incentive schemes will increase the worker's costs 
of malfeasance? 
The same basic question underlies the problem of pollution control and 
environmental enforcement. Despite legal standards for ambient pollution 
concentrations, a firm has an incentive to shirk on pollution control given 
its profits derive from a market price that does not reflect social 
preferences for environmental quality. The regulator's question is how to 
induce the firm to not shirk on pollution control when behavior is 
imperfectly monitored. What incentive scheme will eliminate the incentive 
to shirk? 
One suggested solution for both labor and environmental problems is 
that of an assurance bonding system [see Becker and Stigler (1974), Bohra 
and Russell (1985), and Perrings (1989)]. A bond is a direct mechanism to 
induce socially desirable incentives in both workers and firms. In the 
labor example, the worker would post a bond prior to employment, and then 
would forfeit the bond if he were caught shirking. The bond increases the 
expected costs of shirking, thereby reducing the incentive for malfeasance. 
The same principle is proposed for environmental control. A firm posts a 
bond that will be forfeited if pollution control is inadequate. 
Yet the question remains as to why bonds are the exception rather than 
the rule. With few exceptions, even in the labor market, bonds are rarely 
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used [see Carmichael (1989) and Dickens et al. (1989)]. Because the labor 
market is relatively more complete and efficient, why should we expect 
bonds to be any easier to implement for large-scale, long-term 
environmental problems? The point is that we should not. Although bonds 
have been proposed and implemented in the form of deposit-refund systems 
[see Bohm (1981)], there are limitations to bonds as a solution to any 
problem of undesirable incentives, and broad environmental problems are no 
exception. Since the labor literature has identified several key 
limitations to bonding, our goal is to determine how these limits relate to 
environmental issues. We employ the lessons learned over the past two 
decades by researchers in the field of labor economics to consider when 
bonds may or may not be practical and how bonds can be augmented with other 
incentive devices for a more effective mechanism to reduce shirking in the 
environmental workplace. 
First, we begin by reviewing the identified benefits of environmental 
bonds. We briefly consider three of the advantages described in Bohm 
(1981) and Perrings (1989): (a) efficiency, (b) value registration, and 
(c) research incentive. Costanza and Perrings (1990) also argue that 
environmental bonds have benefits beyond reducing shirking. Specifically, 
it is argued that bonds further encourage firms to provide information to 
the regulator by shifting the "burden of proof" of environmental damage 
from the government to the firm. 
Second, we describe the limits to bonding as identified in the labor 
literature and discuss how they relate to environmental issues. We focus 
on three key limitations: government moral hazard, liquidity constraints, 
and legal restrictions on contracting. Government moral hazard exists when 
the government has an incentive to falsely claim that the firm is shirking, 
thereby acquiring the value of the bond. Liquidity constraints exist when 
a firm is forced to post a bond ex ante, thereby restricting entry into the 
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industry since not all firms can acquire the capital necessary for the 
bond. Imperfect contract enforcement can affect bond performance for a 
variety of reasons including illegalities, formation defenses, performance 
excuses, and the inability of the enforcer to do the job.^ All three 
limitations offer a challenge to the successful implementation of bonds for 
environmental management. We also discuss problems of source identity, 
intertemporal discounting, and the valuation of uncertain market 
activities. 
s 
Third, we describe a real world example of performance bonds as 
applied to the mining industry. We discuss the conditions under which 
bonding is performed and the conditions to be met before the bond is 
released in case of the surface coal mining in the states of Pennsylvania 
and West Virginia. This is followed by an identification of the key 
conditions under which bonds may work efficiently. 
Fourth, to illustrate the potential difficulties with environmental 
bonds, we explore their use in reducing non-point source pollution from 
agricultural production. Since the significant increases in agricultural 
production are due in part to the introduction and expanded use of agri-
chemicals such as pesticides and fertilizers, this sector provides a useful 
example. We conclude that the major difficulty with bonds is the liquidity 
constraints of farmers. These constraints will be binding given the 
thinness of the insurance market and the fact that debt-to-equity ratios 
are already high in this sector. 
Fifth, we identify other incentive devices suggested by the labor 
literature to reduce the incentive for shirking. Specifically, we examine 
the labor concepts of efficiency wages, increasing wage profiles, trust 
funds, and rank-order tournaments. 
^Each of these contract enforcement problems is described in 
Section 3.3 below. 
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If solutions can be found to reduce the potential limits to bonds, 
then we will have increased confidence that bonds can become a useful 
policy tool for global environmental management. Finally, we offer our 
conclusions. 
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2. ADVANTAGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL BONDS 
Bonds have been suggested as an Instrument to control the external 
effects from pollution and resource depletion [e.g., Bohm (1981), Bohm and 
Russell (1985), Perrings (1989), and Costanza and Perrings (1990)]. 
Environmental bonds originate from the material user fees proposed by Solow 
(1971) and Mills (1972) where a private entity is required to post a bond 
covering any potential environmental damages. The goal is for the firm to 
internalize perceived social costs into its private resource allocation 
decisions. The value of the bond would be a function of the environmental 
authority's best estimate of the worst outcome of any specified activity 
given the current state of knowledge.^ The bond value would change over 
time to reflect both practical experience and the results of theoretical 
and experimental research into innovative activities. Bonds would also 
insure that the funds exist to indemnify society against the future 
environmental costs of current activities, with this funding increasing in 
proportion to the perceived risks. Given uncertain damages, environmental 
bonds may be an attractive alternative to Pigouvian taxes and quantity 
constraints. 
Perrings (1989, p. 101) suggests a number of advantages to 
environmental bonds. We focus on three of these: (a) efficiency and the 
incentive to shirk; (b) value registration, revealing the value placed on 
the potential damages from the proposed project by the environmental 
authority; and (c) research incentives and shifting the burden of proof. 
2.1 Efficiency and the Incentive to Shirk 
Consider the simple analytics of the use of bonds to reduce incentives 
to shirk. Becker and Stigler (1974) demonstrate that with perfect 
Perrings (1989, p. 99) refers to this worst outcome as the "focus 
loss" of an activity, "... describing the least unbelievable conjectural 
cost." 
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monitoring the value of the bond should equal or exceed the value of the 
disutility of effort. Let B represent the value of bond, p represent the 
probability of detection of shirking, and v represent the value of 
disutility of effort. With perfect monitoring the probability of detection 
equals one (i.e., p = 1). Shirking can be eliminated by setting B > v. 
The cost of shirking (B) then exceeds the disutility of effort avoided by 
shirking (v). With imperfect monitoring, however, the value of the bond 
must be increased to reflect the reduced probability of detection and 
maintain the expected penalty (i.e., so that pB > v).^ Since monitoring 
expends real resources while posting' the bond does not, the seemingly 
efficient strategy is to reduce the detection probability as low as 
possible while increasing the value of the bonds as high as possible. This 
is a classic economic solution to shirking: "hang tax evaders with 
probability zero" [Kolm (1973)]. 
Although an infinitesimal detection probability and an infinite bond 
are unlikely for several reasons outlined in the next section, the message 
is clear: a firm that requires a worker to post a bond imposes an actual 
cost for shirking. The worker must take this cost into account when 
deciding whether or not to shirk while on the job. The result is that the 
worker will provide the effort that the firm desires. 
The application of bonds to the environment reflects an identical 
objective: a government agency requires the firm to post a bond so that 
inadequate pollution control will result in the loss of all or a portion of 
the bond. Firms will now internalize their impacts on social welfare that 
are unaccounted for in the market place in order to ensure recovery of 
their bond. There is an increased incentive to provide a socially optimal 
^See Parsons (1986, pp. 806-807) for additional discussion. 
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level of pollution control or safety precautions, given the positive cost 
for shirking [also see Bohm and Russell (1985)]. 
2.2 Value Registration 
Perrings (1989) identifies a series of benefits not addressed in the 
labor literature. For example, posting the bond would require an explicit 
registration of the value of potential environmental costs of an activity, 
opening the issue to public debate and scrutiny. This value registration 
could then act as a benchmark to guide the environmental costs of future 
innovative activities. Of course, determining the value of the bond will 
be a difficult task. If the benefit of bonds is to avoid events of which 
we are completely ignorant of the damages, then it will challenge 
researchers in both non-market valuation and natural resource accounting. 
If the value of the bond is unclear, then the firm has significant 
incentive to play an active role in the process. The firm would find it in 
its interest to invest resources into either direct research or lobbying 
activities or both to get the value as low as possible. Explicit value 
registration will be a confrontation activity. 
2.3 Research Incentive and Shifting the Burden of Proof 
The value of the bond is determined by the potential environmental 
impact of the firm's activity. If a firm can prove the cost of 
environmental damages of an activity is less than the cost of their posted 
bond, then the value of the bond can be reduced. Therefore, Perrings 
(1989) argues that the firm has an incentive to invest resources in R&D to 
discover the true value of environmental damages or increase the use of 
inputs that are more benign to the environment.^ This incentive is 
enhanced, according to Costanza and Perrings (1990), by the implied shift 
^However, as noted by Perrings (1989, p. 104), "... environmental 
research suffers acutely from the problem of moral hazard. ... In other 
words, privately funded research would tend to downplay the environmental 
costs of innovative activity." 
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in the burden of proof from the public to the firm. Instead of taking the 
firm to court to prove that the firm was liable for damages, now the firm 
must prove that no environmental effects have occurred. Otherwise, a 
portion or the entire amount of the bond would be forfeited and used for 
renovation. This not only discourages the firm from shirking, but also 
encourages it to keep and provide records and to conduct research that 
would establish the firm's innocence. However, while there are benefits to 
the additional research and information, it is arguable as to whether this 
shift in the burden of proof represents an optimal risk sharing strategy. 
Individual firms are generally viewed as more risk averse than the 
government, or society as a whole. Shifting the burden of proof from the 
public to the firm represents a shifting of risk towards a more risk averse 
segment, rather than away from it.^ 
2.A Other Advantages 
A number of additional benefits have been attributed to bonds in 
either the labor or environmental literature. Perrings (1989), for 
example, argues for the flexibility of the bonding approach. Specifically, 
since the bond's value can be adjusted over time, it can reflect increased 
knowledge about the potential damages from a firm's activity, or diminish 
as the passage of time proves some of the feared damages to be unfounded. 
Bohm and Russell (1985) note that bonds also provide firms with an 
alternative to the production delays that normally result from lengthy 
governmental testing requirements. By posting a bond, the firm could 
proceed with its activity, while essentially guaranteeing the outcome of 
the government tests. Bonds may also be used, as in the labor arena, to 
reduce turnover, or at least the impact of turnover. Firms leaving an 
environmentally sensitive industry would not have access to their posted 
^At the same time, the firm's superior information must also be taken 
into account while shifting the risk from the government to the firm. 
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bonds immediately, but would have to wait until the feared damages from 
their past activities were either proved unfounded or were covered by the 
bond. This provides an incentive for firms (and their legal successors) to 
continue to monitor and control the impacts of their past activities, even 
after leaving an industry. Finally, bonds may be appealing in the 
political arena, since deposit systems for recyclable resources have proven 
effective throughout the world. 
In addition to the basic research incentives provided by bonds (i.e., 
by reducing the damages associated with an activity, or by proving that 
fears of such damages are unfounded, the firm may recover the bond early), 
Perrings (1989, p. 101) argues that a second research benefit exists. 
"Since the bond would yield interest income, it would generate public 
research funds in direct proportion to the public concern about the future 
effects of innovative activities." The problem with this approach, 
however, is that the bond has been posted as a guarantee, to be returned in 
full to the firm if damages do not in fact occur. By skimming a portion of 
the bond's interest earnings to fund public research, the firm is being 
punished ex ante for participating in innovative activities, since a 
portion of its wealth stream is lost regardless of the future state of the 
world. The skimming of interest for public research funds reduces the rate 
of return the firm receives on its bond, presumably below its alternatives 
in the market place and discouraging investment in this sector. The 
problem here is similar to the moral hazard problem discussed in section 3 
below. In this case, rather than falsely claiming liability and the bond 
itself, the government would be claiming a portion of its income earning 
potential with no evidence, or even claim, of liability. 
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3. LIMITS TO BONDS 
Despite the numerous advantages claimed for bonds or entrance fees, 
there are few examples of their use in the real world, either for labor 
[Carmichael (1989), Dickens et al. (1989)] or environmental management 
[Bohm (1981)]. Their limited use has been attributed in large part to 
three disadvantages discussed extensively in the labor context: (a) moral 
hazard, (b) liquidity constraints, and (c) legal restrictions on contracts. 
3.1 Moral Hazard 
In the labor literature, a major limit to bonding is the fear of firm 
moral hazard. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) argue that the firm has an 
incentive to capture the worker's bond by simply stating that the worker 
has shirked. The worker would then be left with the option of challenging 
the firm or finding new employment. Because legal action is costly, the 
worker may simply search for new employment. Therefore, unless there is a 
third party impartial to the proceedings, the worker will have no incentive 
to work for a firm whose trustworthiness is uncertain [see Carmichael 
(1985)]. 
From the public choice viewpoint in the case of environmental bonds, 
there would be a similar potential for government moral hazard [see 
Buchanan and Tullock (1975)]. If regulators are interested in maximizing 
their own private welfare rather than social welfare, then there is a 
nontrivial likelihood that the government could label the firm as a 
shirker, thereby confiscating all, or part, of the bond, based on purported 
damage. The government is the sole seller of bonds, and the firm has no 
choice but to either post the bond or not go into business in that country. 
Firms who want to do business in a country face the risk that the 
government will unjustifiably take the bond. Appeals to third parties may 
be ineffective, at best, given the lack of an effective international 
court. 
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For example, Rich (1985) notes that the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 creates liability 
without cause. In the case of the United States vs. South Carolina 
Recycling and Disposal, Inc., the government argued that CERCLA did not 
require proof that a substance found on a site had been released or 
threatens to be released by the defendant. Liability is attached to the 
mere presence of the substance at the site from which other substances were 
released. These liability rules would create such significant uncertainty 
for firms that the government could argue that the firm had shirked and 
confiscate the bond.^ 
Mitigating this moral hazard problem is the impact that false bond 
claims would have on the reputation of the principal in this principal-
agent relationship. In the labor literature, cheating imposes a future 
cost on the firm, as its diminished reputation requires it to pay higher 
wages [Becker and Stigler (1974)]. Likewise, cheating on the part of the 
government would reduce social welfare by discouraging innovative activity, 
requiring an increased rate of return in the sector or a subsidy offered by 
the government to offset its own cheating. However, there are several 
reasons to believe that reputation would be a less effective disciplining 
force in the environmental arena, relative to the labor market. First, the 
market would be generally thinner, with the number of firms small relative 
to the size of the bonds being posted. Second, the time horizon on 
environmental bonds would outlast most government administrations, 
encouraging current administrations to discount these reputation effects 
Another argument for government moral hazard is Niskanen's (1971) 
theory of the bureaucracy. The theory argues that bureaucrats obtain more 
wealth and power through the expansion of the size and scope of their 
agencies, achieved by maximizing the agency's budget. If the objective is 
to maximize the budget, then the agency has a strong incentive to claim the 
firm has shirked. 
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and future administrations to dismiss them as part of the past.^ 
3.2 Liquidity Constraints 
The second major factor limiting the use of bonds is liquidity 
constraints. For labor, workers often do not possess enough capital or 
cash to post a bond to secure employment. As noted by Dickens et al. 
(1989, p. 338), "workers cannot post bonds with liquid assets they do not 
have." Eaton and White (1982) demonstrate that even with perfect capital 
markets in which the worker could borrow the bond, the possibility of 
worker default still prevents a bond from effectively inducing the optimal 
level of effort. They also show that if workers differ by wealth, then the 
firm will find it in its interest to discriminate, only employing the 
richest workers. 
Liquidity constraints also apply to environmental bonds, perhaps even 
more strictly. When confronting potential environmental damages, the costs 
may well go as high as hundreds of millions of dollars. Requiring a firm 
to post a bond of this magnitude will severely constrain its assets. The 
larger the bond required, the greater the probability that a firm will have 
insufficient liquid assets to deposit up front. If the firm cannot post 
the bond, then the project might be dropped even though, from the ex post 
social welfare viewpoint, the initiative may be beneficial. In contrast to 
Costanza and Perrings' (1990) argument that bonds are "minimally intrusive 
into the internal operations of the regulated firm" (p. 72), we contend 
that liquidity constraints will be binding in many instances, affecting 
both the possibility of default and borrowing ability of the firm. 
Costanza and Perrings' (1990) optimism rests on the assumption that 
capital markets will develop so that the firm can risk-pool by insuring 
There is also the potential for firm moral hazard. If the firm 
realizes its damage exceeds the bond, then they have an incentive to shirk. 
The bond is no longer an effective threat to reduce shirking. 
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against the bond. A possible solution is for insurance markets to develop 
to spread the risk of the firm defaulting on borrowed assets used to post 
the bond. In labor markets, such insurance markets do exist to insure 
against employee dishonesty [see Botnick (1983) for details]. The size of 
bonds needed for labor relative to those for environmental issues, however, 
suggest that, in the environmental arena, insurance markets will bear a 
significantly higher risk of a major multibillion dollar claim. The cost 
of a policy backing an environmental bond will be significant, thereby 
increasing the possibility of default. 
Default has created a dilemma for insurance firms who have attempted 
to insure firms from environmental litigation. Although Suskind (1992) 
points out that some banking concerns such as Fleet Financial Group Inc. 
require nearly all commercial real estate borrowers to secure environmental 
liability insurance before they obtain a loan, Rich (1985) stresses that 
recent developments in environmental litigation are causing a "wholesale 
retreat" from the environment liability market. Pollution insurance has 
become increasingly scarce over the past decade due to insurers' inability 
to properly underwrite environmental liability. The Wall Street Journal 
(1992) states that the number of insurance agencies for pollution liability 
declined from 57 in 1983 to just three in 1992. Rich notes that 
regulations such as CERCLA create retroactive and nearly absolute liability 
and impose joint and several liability [also see Tietenberg (1989)]. These 
changes in liability have created a climate of such uncertainty that 
insurance companies are unlikely to respond immediately to the call to back 
environmental bonds. Because litigation costs for CERCLA range from $3.5 
to $6.4 billion for the 1,800 National Priority List sites, insurers will 
be extremely cautious about liability for environmental hazards [see Rich 
(1985, p. 41)]. 
Other problems with the insurance market include the classic example 
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of adverse selection, which exists when those firm who are most likely to 
forfeit search out the insurer or a banker. A self-selection bias exists 
such that the insurer or banker may perceive only untrustworthy firms enter 
the market [see Akerlof (1970)]. Weiss (1990, p. 9) outlines why bankers 
would be reluctant to give loans to finance bonds under adverse selection. 
A firm wanting to borrow funds for the bond takes into account both the 
market price and the probability of not being caught shirking by the 
government. Bonds financed by the bank encourage firms to enter markets or 
undertake innovations where the probability of successful shirking is low, 
but the reward for success is high. This arises because the firm only 
fully pays the borrowed bond if successful. Therefore, the firm can reduce 
its expected cost of the bond by entering low success probability markets. 
Bankers would recognize the firm's incentive and would, therefore, not lend 
funds for the bond. 
If private insurers do not create the market necessary to reduce 
liquidity constraints, then some other institution must be developed. The 
obvious institution is some form of government insurance agency. A firm 
would then have access to capital to post the bond by borrowing or insuring 
through the government. Government insurance institutions, however, have 
not always been effective. The bailout of the savings and loan industry is 
one recent example. Other possibilities include group coverage or self-
insurance schemes, both of which are complex, but potential, institutional 
frameworks to overcome liquidity constraints associated with environmental 
bonds [see Faron (1985)]. 
Another indirect effect of liquidity is that even if the assets for 
bonds could be borrowed, the firm now has less borrowing capacity for other 
capital. New capital for production or research will be restricted if the 
firm has used a potentially large fraction of borrowing capacity to post 
the bond. This indirect effect will constrain the overall development of 
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the firm, which may not be beneficial from a social welfare viewpoint. 
Bohm (1981, p. 125) provides some evidence that liquidity constraints 
may not be such a problem as we have suggested. The Swedish government 
required Swedish charter companies to post a bond of 50,000 SEK (1972 
value) to be used to compensate customers in case a trip was unexpectedly 
canceled. Bohm notes that even with the bond the industry more than 
doubled in size from 57 firms in 1972 to 130 firms in 1978. Given the 
relatively small bond and the significant increase in leisure demand, the 
bond was not a barrier to entry. If we are considering firms where the 
potential environmental costs are in the multimillions, however, then the 
bond would pose a more significant barrier. We can only speculate at this 
point, but given the insurance industry's retreat from the environmental 
liability market, such large values may create a significant challenge to 
the use of bonds as an efficient incentive mechanism. 
3.3 Legal Restrictions on Contracts 
A bond is a contract between the firm and the worker or the government 
and the firm. If the contract is breached by shirking or lax pollution 
control, then the worker or firm will forfeit the bond. Given perfect 
enforcement of the contract, the bond will efficiently achieve the goal of 
socially desirable work effort or pollution control. However, contracts 
are imperfectly enforced. Illegality, enforcer sloth, formation defenses, 
and performance excuses all provide an avenue for the worker or firm to 
challenge the loss of a bond for shirking. The labor literature recognizes 
the limits of bonds due to legal restrictions on contracts. Dickens et al. 
(1989) point out that confiscating a bond may be viewed by the courts as an 
unfair penalty. This is especially true if the bond is set high relative 
to damages in order to reduce monitoring expenses. A loss of this bond 
would be seen as a supercompensatory damage award. Recognizing that 
imperfect enforcement is a fact, the worker's cost of shirking may seem 
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lower because he/she can challenge the firm's authority to confiscate the 
bond. The incentive of the bond is diminished, thereby limiting its 
effectiveness in inducing optimal effort levels. 
Imperfect contractual enforcement also exists for environmental bonds. 
If the government claims the firm has shirked on pollution control, then 
the firm has a strong incentive to challenge the loss of the bond. We 
consider two main attacks the firm could use: performance excuses and 
formation defenses. See Posner (1986) or Cooter and Ulen (1988) for 
complete discussions of imperfect enforcement of contracts. 
Suppose a firm has its bond confiscated due to a perceived failure to 
adequately control pollution. The firm could argue that forces or acts of 
God beyond its control, which were not explicitly outlined in the contract, 
caused their failure. Natural catastrophes, including earthquakes or 
floods, provide a performance excuse for the firm if the terms of the 
contract are now physically impossible to fulfill. The firm may also argue 
that changes in the environment destroy the purpose of the contract, 
thereby limiting the usefulness of the bond to deter shirking. 
If a performance excuse fails, then the firm can turn to a formation 
defense. A formation defense is used when there are perceived 
imperfections in the procedures to define the contract. Imperfections 
include incompetence, unilateral or mutual mistake, misrepresentation, and 
unconscionability. The firm could challenge the loss of the bond by 
arguing that the monitoring agency was incompetent in forming the value 
registration of the bond. The accuracy of measures of non-market values 
may prove a point of contention if the firm challenges the competence of 
the investigators assigning values. Mistakes or misunderstandings offer 
the firm an opportunity to recapture their bond. If the details of the 
contract do not specify all contingencies, then the chance increases that 
the firm will successfully argue that it misunderstood ambiguous clauses. 
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Misrepresentation excuses occur if the government has withheld information 
or has misrepresented the damages associated with shirking. If the 
government's objective is to seek rents by setting rents, then overstating 
damages will force the firm to post too large a bond. Finally, if all else 
fails, the firm could appeal to the doctrine of unconscionability. 
Unconscionability is a vague, shadowy area that steps beyond the 
traditional definitions of duress to include threats, bargaining 
incompetence, and asymmetric information. 
Legal restrictions due to both performance excuses and formation 
defenses limit the effectiveness of environmental bonds. A firm can always 
challenge the loss of a bond. This gives firms strong incentive to 
allocate resources to a legal war chest to challenge or stall government 
procedures [see Kambhu (1990)]. Resource that could be used more 
productively will be used in costly legal battles. To illustrate the legal 
costs associated with environmental hazard, we again need only consider 
CERCLA. Rich (1985) estimates litigation costs will exceed $8 billion in 
battles over liability of superfund sites, 79 percent of which will be paid 
by private firms. Yandle (1988) notes that the resources spent on 
litigation could clear up another 400 superfund sites. The threat of 
imperfect enforcement of a contract can significantly reduce the efficiency 
of the environmental bond. 
3.à Other Limitations to Bonds 
Three issues prominent in the labor literature (i.e., liquidity 
constraints, moral hazard, and legal restrictions) are also major 
limitations to environmental bonds. There also exist other limitations 
such as source identity, intertemporal problems, and valuation of damages 
which are common to any pollution control instrument. The following 
sections address each of these issues and considers ways to solve some of 
the problems. 
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3.4.1 Source Identity 
The identification of the source of environmental damages could 
potentially create two problems. First, the causation of damages, such as 
the occurrence of cancer due to agriculture pollution, is not always known 
with certainty, making it difficult to identify the potential cancer 
causing firm or the producer that should post the bond. Second there can 
be more than one cause for a given environmental damage. Consider non-
point source pollution created by the agricultural sector. The cause of 
groundwater contamination with fertilizers and pesticides may be 
attributable to farmers in the region, but the contributions of individual 
farmers is generally unknown. Under such a situation it is difficult to 
determine the value of the bond to be posted by each producer. This leads 
to the question of who should post the environmental bond. 
A number of authors have addressed the source identity problem 
(Shavell, 1980, Landes and Posner, 1980, Sandler and Sterbenz, 1988, and 
Shave11, 1985). Shavell (1985), for example, has examined two solutions: 
1) the proportionality rule (i.e., the firm is liable for the damages in 
proportion to the probability of their causation of the damage) and 2) the 
threshold rule (i.e., the firm is liable for the damages if the probability 
of causation exceeds the preassigned threshold level). The author 
concludes that while the proportionality yields social optimum in many 
cases, the threshold rule will not yield a social optimum. 
Sandler and Sterbenz (1988) have also examined the liability 
assignment, when asymmetric information drives the source identity problem. 
They introduce the concept of a full damage rule where the firm is levied 
all damages, those that they caused and those that they did not cause. 
In terms of optimality, Sandler and Sterbenz indicate that; 1) the 
proportionality rule leads to the social optimum; 2) the full damage rule 
yields a social optimum, provided that the firm produces a positive output 
24 
level; and 3) the threshold rule yields a social optimum in the longrun, 
when the firm's accidents exceed the threshold and industry size is 
unchanged from that of the proportional rule. Given the optimality of 
different rules, the value of the bond can be determined based on the 
information available on the cause of environmental damage. 
3.4.2 Time Horizon for Bonds 
The main problem associated with posting bonds for a long time horizon 
is that an appropriate social discount rate must be determined. There 
exist several reasons for discounting future benefits and costs (Just et 
al., 1982). First, there is an opportunity cost for consuming the 
resources today, since the resources can be invested to yield a return at a 
later date. Second, consumers often prefer immediate consumption to 
deferred consumption. And third, the future generation may be regarded as 
more or less important than the current one. 
The absence of a unique social discount rate makes it difficult to 
establish an appropriate bond value for an activity involving a long time 
horizon. The social discount rate can be derived by several methods such 
as the market rate of interest and the time preference approach. The 
problem with using the market rate of interest is that there exist several 
interests rates including the consumer loan rate, the savings rate, and 
business rates. Moreover, the market rate of interest for projects that 
exceed the life of the present generation may not truly reflect the 
preferences of future generations, since they do not exist. In addition, 
since interest rates are tools for macroeconomic policies, it may be 
inappropriate to approve or reject projects on the basis of prevailing 
rates of interest. 
In case of other pollution control instruments, such as Pigouvian 
taxation, the problems of choosing a discount factor are minimized because 
the tax is collected every time period. Bonding, on the other hand 
25 
involves collection of discounted expected future damages at the beginning 
of the firm's activity. 
3.4.3 Valuation of Damages 
Valuing environmental assets in general is considered to be difficult, 
since organized markets do not exist for many environmental goods. There 
are currently three primary methods of valuing environmental amenities. 
First, the contingent valuation method (non-market related approach) 
elicits the value of environmental amenities through personal interviews, 
telephone interviews, or mail surveys. Second, the travel cost method uses 
expenditures on recreational trips as proxies for market prices in valuing 
environmental goods. Third, the hedonic pricing method involves eliciting 
the value of an environmental amenity by comparing two market values which 
are different only in environmental quality. The travel cost method and 
the hedonic pricing method are considered as market related approaches 
since they rely on the linkages between goods and services traded in the 
market place and environmental assets. 
Each of the three valuation methods have advantages and disadvantages 
based on the circumstances in which they are used. For example, contingent 
valuation method (CVM) has potentials limitations due to strategic bias, 
design bias, hypothetical bias, and other biases such as non-response bias, 
interviewer bias, and sample selection bias®. The travel cost method has 
limitations including aggregation problems, substitute/complement problems, 
difficulties in estimating the value of travel time and the time spent at 
the site, and multisite visitation problems. Finally, the hedonic pricing 
method also has limitations in terras of assessing the level of customer 
information, the benefits and costs of being away from home, and problems 
due to the treatment of taxes. A common limitation to market related 
®See Cummings et al. (1986) and Mitchell and Carson (1990) for 
additional discussion. 
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approaches is that the travel cost method is applicable to recreational 
sites where travel is involved and the hedonic pricing requires that the 
environmental amenity is associated with some good traded in the market 
place. 
The problems of environmental damage valuation is not unique to bonds. 
Other instruments such as Pigouvian taxation and standards also require 
valuation of environmental damages. When there exists a market to evaluate 
the environmental damages and reclamation costs, as in the case of surface 
coal mining, the valuation problems are insignificant. In case of 
innovative activities, where the markets do not exist, travel cost and 
hedonic pricing methods are not applicable. Cummings et al. (1986), 
discuss four Reference Operating Conditions (ROCs) under which contingent 
valuation method can be applied. First, the commodity must be familiar to 
the subjects. Second, with respect to consumption levels of the commodity, 
the subjects must have had prior valuation and choice experience. Third, 
there must be little uncertainty. Fourth, CVM elicits only willingness-to-
pay, not willingness-to-accept. Kahneman in Cummings et al. (1986, p.185), 
notes that there are three ROCs in addition to the four mentioned by 
Cummings et al., namely that 1) CVM should be used only for problems that 
have a "purchase structure", 2) CVM should be restricted to user values, 
rather than to ideological values, and 3) CVM requires an accurate 
description of the payment mode. 
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4. BONDING IN SURFACE COAL MINING 
Although uncommon, bonding is currently used in a few environmental 
sectors. For example, consider the surface mining of coal. The Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977 requires that operators 
post a bond as a condition to mine coal. The bonds must be adequate to 
perform reclamation in case it is forfeited and the reclamation work has to 
be performed by the regulatory authority (U.S.G.P.O., 1986). The value of 
the bond is determined by the "worst case method".^ 
A performance bond is a legal written obligation to perform a desired 
act required by law or pay a penalty to the regulatory agency involved. 
Forfeiture of the bond is usually stated in terms of dollars per acre of 
disturbed land in the permitting area. Bonding is intended to provide a 
guarantee that reclamation will be done, either by the operator or by a 
third party. The bond is generally released after mining and reclamation 
operations have been inspected by the regulatory authority. 
In meeting the requirements for bond release, the operator is at the 
same time taking the necessary steps to abandon the mine. For surface 
mines, the procedure typically involves final backfilling and regrading. 
It generally includes covering toxic materials or exposed coal seams and 
elimination of the remaining open mines. In some places water impoundments 
may be used to cover spoil and coal seams. Topsoil is replaced in 
reclaiming disturbed acres and revegetation of those areas is completed. 
Before the bond is released and the mine is abandoned, the final 
vegetation of all disturbed areas must have matured to a degree that meets 
the accepted standards. In some states surface water must meet certain 
Although not precisely defined in the literature, the "worst case 
method" appears to be similar to the"focus loss" concept discussed by 
Ferrings (1989). Recall, the focus loss is defined as the best estimate of 
the worst possible outcome of any specified activity, given the current 
state of knowledge. 
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standards, usually related to pH and iron or sedimentation or both. 
Erosion protection such as the construction of diversion ditches and 
vegetation barriers may also be required. A period of time may be required 
for vegetation to get established before it is evaluated by the regulatory 
authority. Before the bond can be released, the following three conditions 
must be met; (1) the site inspection by the state regulatory authority must 
be passed, (2) proper public notice of the reclamation must be made and 
(3) any citizen/land owner complaints must be addressed. 
The practice and success of bonding in the surface coal mining 
industry has been extensively analyzed in the states of Pennsylvania and 
West Virginia. Bonds have had limited success in Pennsylvania. Since 
SMCRA was passed, the bonds on 22,450 acres have been forfeited in 
Pennsylvania and 67 percent of those acres covered by the mining bonds have 
not been reclaimed. In Pennsylvania, it took an average of 4 years to 
completely reclaim the land disturbed by mining after forfeiture. In West 
Virginia, the reclamation of bond forfeiture lands is better than in 
Pennsylvania. Over 67 percent of the approximately 6,700 acres involved in 
bond forfeiture proceedings have been reclaimed (U.S.G.P.O., 1986). It 
took about two years after forfeiture to reclaim the land in West Virginia, 
half of time taken in Pennsylvania. For the acreage claimed by 
Pennsylvania, the average reclamation cost per acre has been about $6,700, 
while the average bond amount per acre has been about $730. In West 
Virginia, the average reclamation cost per acre for the reclaimed acres has 
been about $2,500, while the average bond amount has been about $1,100. 
The additional funds to reclaim the land has come from state supplemental 
funds in both cases. This indicates that the value of the bond collected 
was not sufficient to reclaim the disturbed the lands. It is difficult to 
reclaim the land when the environmental cleanup costs exceed the value of 
the bond, especially when state supplemental funds are not available. 
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Experiences from the application of bonds to surface coal mines 
suggest some conditions under which bonds may work. The mine industry 
normally operates for less than 10 years at any specified site. The 
limited or fixed time horizon of the mine industry facilitates the posting 
and implementation of performance bonds. Moreover, the possible outcomes 
of mining are known to the regulatory authority even though the actual 
outcome is not known. This helps establish a value for the bond based on 
the worst possible outcome. When there is potential for irreversible 
mining effects, such as the extinction of a local endangered species or 
unreclaimable barren land due to mining, the regulator will not permit the 
operator to mine in that particular site. Most of the environmental 
damages (e.g., those due to open deep mines, exposed soil, coal seams, and 
deforestation) are readily observable by the regulator as well as the 
public. Source identity is not a problem in case of coal mining because 
the damages are readily observable and attributable to a single coal miner. 
The cost of reclamation of these damages are estimated by the 
regulator. The value of the mining bonds have ranged from $700-$1500 per 
acre of operation in the states of Pennsylvania and West Virginia. When 
the mines are operated by firms with a working capital in the millions of 
dollars, the value of the bond may not be a big burden for the operator. 
Sometimes surety companies have come forward to pay the bond in case of 
forfeiture or reclaim the land to pre-mining conditions.^® The 
collection of the bond, in case the operator abandons the mines without any 
reclamation, in part depends on the law. For example, the relative success 
of the bonds in West Virginia compared to Pennsylvania can be attributed 
partly to the fact that only the mine operators are eligible to appeal in 
^^Surety companies act as insurance companies in bonding the surface 
coal mines. These companies either reclaim the bad lands to the standards 
specified by the regulatory authority or pay the bond in case the firm is 
found guilty of environmental pollution. 
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West Virginia, whereas, in Pennsylvania both the mine operators and the 
surety companies are allowed to appeal to the state's environmental board. 
In Pennsylvania about 66 percent of the acres involved in the forfeiture 
have been appealed by the surety companies and the mine operators to the 
Pennsylvania's Environmental Hearing Board, whereas only about 4 percent 
were appealed by the mine operators in West Virginia. Therefore the legal 
environment and a well planned bonding system are complements to each 
other. Further, the successful implementation of the bond can be 
attributed in part to the small number of participants in the surface 
mining industry. This not only reduces the administrative costs associated 
with the program but also the source identity problem. 
In summary, the mining example suggests the following key conditions 
under which bonds may work for environmental assets. They are 
1) Valuation: The costs of reclamation (e. g . ,  reforestation, 
levelling, and closing exposed pits) are well understood, 
providing an upper bound on the bond value. In case of 
innovative activities, when it is difficult to value the 
environmental damages, moral hazard may influence the false 
seizure of bonds by the government. 
2) Observability and enforceability: The effects of environmental 
damage caused by an activity must be observable so as to 
facilitate reclamation, as in the case of mining. The legal 
environment in West Virginia (limiting the appeal process to 
mine owners) played a major role in successful implementation 
of bonds. 
3) A small number of participants: Fewer participants can reduce 
the administrative costs associated with environmental bonding, 
as in the case of mining. Moreover, source identity problems 
can be reduced when there are only a few participants. 
4) Fixed time horizon: The problems associated with discounting 
diminish as the time horizon gets shorter, as in the case of 
mining. 
5) Well defined states of the world and probabilities; The 
outcome of activities and the probability of their occurrence 
are known to the firm as well as the regulator. 
6) No irreversible and after effects: In the presence of 
irreversible effects, the forfeited bond cannot be used to 
reclaim the lost environmental quality or endangered species. 
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Relatively small value of the bond: The small size of the bond 
can overcome the liquidity constraints imposed by bonds. In 
addition, the presence of surety companies eases the burden of 
borrowing by mining firms. 
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5. SHOULD FARMERS POST ENVIRONMENTAL BONDS? 
The successful application of bonds in the mining industry suggests 
that bonding can be applied to solve practical environmental problems. 
This section analyses the application of bonds to the control non-point 
source pollution in agriculture. 
Including the conservation title in the Food Security Act of 1985 
signaled an important turning point for agriculture and natural resource 
policy in the United States. The conservation reserve, conservation 
compliance, sodbuster, and swampbuster provisions tied resource management 
to agriculture commodity titles and significant budget allocations for 
coordinating agriculture and environmental policy. These and related 
environmental provisions are continued in the Food, Agriculture, 
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 and the current President's Water 
Quality Initiatives. From these initiatives it is clear that future 
agriculture legislation in the United States will have important 
conservation and environmental content and that these measures will 
directly and indirectly influence the performance of the agricultural 
sector. In order to better understand the impact of coordinating 
agricultural and environmental policies, we evaluate the implications of 
using bonds to resolve environmental problems associated with non-point 
source pollution by agriculture. 
A major form of non-point source pollution associated with the 
agricultural sector is the use of agri-chemicals. In the past four 
decades, government programs have promoted and subsidized increased 
pesticide and nutrient use [see Quigley (1967) and Reichelderfer and Hinkle 
(1989)]. Between 1964 and 1986, the U. S. Department of Agriculture (1985) 
estimates that pesticide use tripled. In 1982, more than 90 percent of 
U.S. row crop acreage was treated with herbicides. Chesters and Schierow 
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(1985) estimate that about 70 percent of nutrients reaching waterways 
originate from agricultural lands. 
The other major impacts of agriculture on water arises from erosion 
and sedimentation. Phipps and Crosson (1986) note that the capacity of 
lakes, irrigation channels, and drainage ditches have declined due to the 
deposition of eroded soil. An estimated 1.4 to 1.5 million acre-feet of 
reservoir and lake capacity is permanently filled each year with sediment 
[Dendy (1968)]. Clark et al. (1985) contend that the annual costs of off-
farm damage from sedimentation, ignoring biological effects, ranges from 
$4.2 billion to $16.9 billion (1985 dollars).^ 
Reducing chemical use, erosion, and sedimentation poses significant 
problems to the environmental manager. Are environmental bonds a solution 
to the agricultural sector's non-point source pollution problems? This is 
not likely, due to the nature of the problem associated with non-point 
source pollution by agriculture. In particular, the previous section 
establishes a set of conditions under which bonds are likely to work. This 
section considers whether each of these seven conditions are applicable to 
the case of non-point source pollution in agriculture. 
5.1 Valuation 
It is difficult to value the damages, including the cancer causing 
potential of some chemicals (Tietenberg, 1988, p.71). Damages such as 
increased nitrogen contamination in water, increased pesticides in the 
agricultural produce, and increased soil erosion in the crop lands are 
difficult to value (Mitchell and Carson, 1990). Therefore, valuation 
problems will exist in the application of bonding to control non-point 
source pollution. 
^^Salinization and waterlogging are also associated with agricultural 
production. See Young and Horner (1986). 
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5.2 Observability and Enforceability 
The effects of non-point source pollution are not readily observable. 
When the damaging effects are not observable, it is difficult to enforce 
the law. The issue of bonds and the law go hand in hand. When agriculture 
is given priority with subsidies, especially in the developing countries, a 
favorable legal environment to implement bonding is unlikely to exist. 
5.3 The Number of Participants 
The large number of participants in agriculture hinders the 
implementation of bonding in two ways. First, the non-point source nature 
of agriculture-induced pollution makes it difficult to estimate the effect 
of an individual producer on environmental quality due to high monitoring 
costs [see Cabe and Herriges (1992)]. Second, the administrative cost of 
implementing bonds will be high. 
5.A Fixed Time Horizon 
The most important reason in explaining why anyone may rationally 
choose to deplete natural resources and destroy ecosystems is intertemporal 
preferences and discounting (Hanemann, 1988). A distinct feature of 
natural resources relative to conventional commodities is that they are not 
instantly renewable and they can only be stocked, if at all, over time and 
subject to biological constraints. Consequently, what matters is how the 
future costs are discounted relative to present benefits. The impact of 
the chosen discount rate on valuation increases with the length of the time 
horizon. In case of agriculture, there exists two problems associated with 
long time horizons. First, there does not exist a unique discount factor 
for the valuation of future benefits and costs. The choice of discount 
factor can significantly alter the size of performance bond assigned to an 
innovative activity and, hence, it creates disincentive for environmental 
shirking. Second, effects such as the carcinogenic nature of the 
agricultural groundwater pollutants persist for a long period of time. As 
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a result, it is difficult to estimate the expected damages of agricultural 
non-point source pollutants. 
5.5 Well Defined States of the World and Probabilities 
Unlike mining, the damaging effects of agri-chemical pollution are not 
known completely due to problems such as the long persistence of pesticides 
in the groundwater. Unlike the case of mining, neither states of the world 
nor their probabilities of occurrence, are clearly defined. 
5.6 No Irreversible and After Effects 
In case of mining most of the damages (e.g., due to exposed coals, 
open pits and mines, etc.) are restorable. In contrast, the effects from 
chemical contamination in the groundwater and soil erosion in the crop land 
may not be reversible. 
5.7 Relatively Small Value of Bond 
Among all the limitations of bonds for application in the field of 
non-point source pollution created by agriculture, liquidity is the major 
one. The USDA estimates that 21 percent of all farmers already have a 
debt-to-equity ratio exceeding 40 percent--a ratio considered high enough 
to cause severe financial stress [see Johnson et al. (1986)]. Harl (1986) 
has noted that financial stress has increased to the extent that the 
frequency of farm foreclosures, forfeitures on land contracts, and defaults 
on notes have reached levels not seen since the Great Depression. In fact, 
from 1982 to 1986, the U. S. government paid $8 billion to farmers through 
commodity programs, more than 31 percent of net farm income [USDA (1986)]. 
Because producers are already receiving subsidies to maintain farm income, 
introducing an additional lump sum bond payment is probably not feasible. 
In addition, producers often take short-term loans before planting 
season. The bond will require farm operators to trade off loans for 
current production with loans to finance the bond. Each producer has a 
limit to its borrowing capacity, and imposing an additional constraint in 
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the form of a performance bond may well drive the small operators with 
limited equity out of business. This can lead to an even more concentrated 
industry. 
The possibility of environmental insurance markets coming into 
existence as a solution to liquidity constraints is low due to the 
uncertainty involved in the agricultural sector. Because producers depend 
on weather, there is no guarantee that the producer can meet the monthly 
premiums to secure coverage. Therefore, private insurers will be hesitant 
to enter the market. Although farmers may purchase crop insurance, many 
have not. Because the federal disaster relief payments enacted in 1988 and 
1989, which covered up to $100,000 of losses, other insurance sellers will 
find few buyers [see Kennedy and Visser (1990)]. In essence, disaster 
relief payments provide a costless form of insurance for the farmer. The 
government could reverse the insurance so that instead of farm disaster, 
they would insure against environmental disaster from the farm. This would 
then make the government the safety net for damages both to agriculture and 
from agriculture. 
Another solution to eliminate liquidity constraints is to secure the 
bond by a lien on the nondepreciable assets of the farm. Since there would 
be no up-front payment, the farmers would not be directly bound by their 
liquid assets. They would be bound, however, by the fact that the value of 
their nondepreciable assets might not cover the potential environmental 
damage. This is especially a problem in agriculture, since the monitoring 
and assigning damages will be difficult. In the agricultural sector, 
especially in developing countries when the farmers are provided with 
subsidies to encourage production, introduction of a bond creates 
financial burden on the part of farmers. All these problems together 
contribute as the major factors that reduce the attractiveness of using 
environmental bonds in the agricultural sector. In the next section, we 
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consider whether the labor literature has other alternatives to reducing 
shirking, and whether these other schemes might work in agriculture. 
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6. OTHER INCENTIVE SCHEMES OFFERED BY THE LABOR LITERATURE 
Faced with the apparent rejection of bonding in real labor markets, 
the labor literature has developed a series of alternatives to bonds, both 
as theoretical enforcement constructs and as means of explaining stylized 
characteristics of the labor industry (e.g., pensions, hierarchical wage 
structures, and mandatory retirement). Given the parallels between the 
labor and environmental shirking problems, the question naturally arises as 
to whether market forces in the labor industry have developed tools that 
have a place in environmental management as well. In this section, we 
explore four labor enforcement mechanisms: (a) efficiency wages, 
(b) increasing wage profiles, (c) trust funds, and (d) rank-order 
tournaments. 
6.1 Efficiency Images 
Efficiency wage models have received considerable attention in the 
labor literature, initially as an explanation of involuntary unemployment 
in developing countries [Liebenstein (1957)] and later as a mechanism for 
firms to reduce worker shirking, to lower turnover rates, and to 
improve the quality and performance of workers.Efficiency wages also 
overcome the liquidity constraints faced by bonds. The concept of 
efficiency wages is a simple one, based on the notion that the level of 
effort (or efficiency) of the worker will depend upon the real wage he or 
she receives. By offering workers a wage in excess of the "market clearing" 
wage, the firm increases its hourly wage costs, but this is offset by the 
increased productivity of the worker. In the case of the worker, our hired 
hand from the introduction, we increase the chances that our lawn will in 
^^The literature on efficiency wages is extensive, including Akerlof 
(1982,1984), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Calvo and Wellisz (1979), 
Malcomson (1984), and Salop (1979). Reviews of the literature can be found 
in Akerlof and Yellen (1986), Yellen (1984), Weiss (1990), and Parsons 
(1986). See Lindbeck and Snower (1988) for an alternative view. 
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fact be mowed by offering him $3 an hour instead of $2. The increased wage 
improves his morale, his attitude towards us as an employer, and his 
opportunity costs of shirking.If he fails to work and is caught, he 
may only be able to find work at the lower wage (i.e., in the "secondary 
market"). 
Efficiency wages are not new to environmental economics, but rather 
than taking the form of an implicit contract, they have been developed as 
an explicit contract in the form of Pigouvian subsidies.Firms that 
shirk, by damaging the environment, are forced into a secondary market 
where they earn only the market rate of return on their investments. In 
this context, Pigouvian taxes can be thought of as a negative efficiency 
wage. In the labor field, this would correspond with paying individuals 
their marginal value product in the primary industry, but having the 
ability to garner a portion of their wages should they quit and become 
employed in the secondary labor market. Finally, implicit efficiency 
wages, similar to Akerlof's (1982, 1984) "gift exchange," may also exist in 
the environmental arena, with the firm tacitly exchanging additional effort 
There are several reasons for this linkage between wages and worker 
productivity, which Weiss (1990) categorizes into direct and indirect 
effects. The direct effects arise due to the impact of real wages on the 
health of the worker [Liebenstein (1957)]. The worker will not, or cannot, 
work hard if our $2 wage does not provide for a sufficient level of 
nutrition and health care. Indirect effects can arise due to the impact 
that wages can have on the worker's sense of morale and firm loyalty. 
Akerlof (1982, 1984), for example, explains efficiency wages as a partial 
gift exchange between the worker and the firm, with the firm providing 
higher wages in exchange for the worker's gift of loyalty and effort in 
excess of minimum effort levels. 
^^Klein and Leffler (1981) identify a "price premium" that could be 
used as a means of guaranteeing contractual performance. This premium is 
to compensate the buyer or seller who invests in capital that is specific 
to a transaction. For example, utilities invest in coal-fired generators 
that require a specific coal for maximum thermal efficiency [Kerkvliet and 
Shogren (1992)]. Whether this price premium could be used on a sustained 
basis to make environmental-specific technology more attractive is open for 
debate. 
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in pollution control for government leniency regarding pollution control 
standards at a future date.^^ 
In agriculture, commodity and price supports could be considered an 
efficiency wage. If price supports were coupled with environmental 
performance, then shirking could result in a significant penalty. The 
total level of support for a crop is determined mainly by the target price-
-the minimum income support on all eligible production. The farmer 
receives a deficiency payment that equals the difference between the target 
price and the average market price (or loan rate). Loss of this income 
support could be used as a penalty due to shirking on environmental 
protection. This penalty, in fact, exists with the enactment of the 1985 
Food Security Act. Both the sodbuster (producing on highly erodible land) 
and the swampbuster (converting wetlands to farm use) provisions specify 
the penalty of shirking as denied access to government programs, including 
price and income supports. With the current President's 1990 Water Quality 
Initiative, this penalty could be extended beyond erosion and wetlands to 
also include water contamination by agri-chemical use. 
6.2 Increasing Wage Profiles 
Lazear (1979, 1981) provides an alternative to assurance bonds that 
avoids the liquidity constraint problem, while retaining an incentive for 
workers to abstain from shirking. Under increasing (or life cycle) wage 
profiles, workers are initially paid less than their value marginal product 
(VMP). This deficiency is made up over time as the worker's wage is 
gradually increased to beyond their VMP. As noted by Carmichael (1989), 
this is essentially an installment plan version of assurance bonding. 
While verification of such tacit agreements is difficult, explicit 
versions of this type of gift exchange can be seen in the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990. For example, firms that reduce toxic air pollution 
emission early, by 90 percent or more, are given six additional years to 
meet the corresponding MACT standards [Wegman (1991)]. 
41 
Early in their careers, workers contribute to a fund that will later return 
them wages beyond their VMP. They are reluctant to shirk during their 
careers, for fear of losing this investment. In return, firms can offer 
wage streams with high discounted present value due to the increase in 
productivity. 
The environmental counterpart to an increasing wage profile would 
involve a combination of taxes and subsidies. Firms would initially pay 
taxes into an environmental incentive fund. Over a fixed time period, these 
taxes would be gradually converted into a subsidy, paying the firm back the 
fund's principal and interest. Unfortunately, while this mechanism 
provides firms with some incentive to avoid shirking, it will not be 
completely effective. As pointed out by Akerlof and Katz (1989) in the 
labor context, workers will have greater incentive to shirk early on in 
their careers, when their contributions to the installment bond fund have 
been small, and hence the cost of shirking and being caught is small. In 
fact, Akerlof and Katz (1989) demonstrate that the wage profiles concept 
will only work if they take the extreme form of a trust fund, with workers 
paid a flat wage during their entire career, with a guaranteed bonus or 
pension upon retirement. This leads naturally to the consideration of 
labor, and environmental, trusts. 
6.3 Trust Funds 
One solution to the liquidity constraint problem in the labor market 
is to have the firm post the assurance bond, rather than the worker. In 
essence, this vests the initial "property right" of shirking with the 
worker, rather than with the firms. It is not surprising then to find that 
Akerlof and Katz's (1989) optimal trust equals v/p when workers are risk 
neutral and the discount rate is zero.^^ This is exactly the size of the 
l^Recall that v equals the value of the disutility of effort and p 
denotes the probability of being caught shirking. 
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optimal up-front bond. The initial costs have just been transferred to the 
firm. In a like manner, government agencies could encourage pollution 
abatement efforts by establishing environmental trusts for existing firms. 
If damages occur prior to a specified time period, the trust would be drawn 
down to cover these costs. At the end of the period, the firms could claim 
the remainder of the trust. Firms would have an incentive to avoid 
environmental damages in order to maintain the value of the trust, just as 
they would with an up-front bond. Again, the cross-compliance provisions 
in recent farm bills can be viewed as short-term trusts. Farmers are given 
access to commodity programs if they meet specified environmental 
constraints. One limit to the trust approach, of course, is that 
governments also face liquidity, or at least budget, constraints. In 
addition, there is the risk that the practice of establishing environmental 
trusts would encourage new firms to enter an industry and exaggerate their 
potential for damage to the environment, just to gain access to the trust 
17 system. 
6.4 Rank-Order Tournaments 
While both wage profiles and trust funds provide alternatives to 
assurance bonding that reduce the liquidity constraint problem, neither 
addresses the moral hazard problem of the principal in this principal-agent 
problem. In the case of increasing wage profiles, the firm would have an 
incentive to falsely claim malfeasance once the worker's wage exceeded his 
marginal value product, whereas he would wait until just before retirement 
under a trust system. Similar problems would arise in the application of 
these policy tools to environmental management. 
Rank-order tournaments, initially developed by Lazear and Rosen 
^^A similar argument has been raised against the use of subsidies, 
versus taxes, in controlling pollution problems. See, for example. Downing 
(1984, p. 181). 
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(1981), avoid the principal's moral hazard problem by precommitting her to 
a fixed budget outlay. The multiple agents are discouraged from shirking 
by tying the total reward to their final performance ranking. For example, 
in a single-period labor market model, firms would commit to paying a fixed 
percentage (P) of the workers a high wage (W), while the remaining workers 
would receive a lower wage (w). The firm is assumed to be able to observe 
each worker's productivity only with error.They have an incentive to 
award the higher wage to the most productive workers in order to encourage 
production, with no associate incentive to cheat, since it would not alter 
their total wage bill. Workers are encouraged to work in order to receive 
the higher wage.The level of shirking is controlled by altering the 
spread between W and w and the probability of "promotion" to the high wage. 
The risk is, of course, that the workers will collude, providing a lower 
level of overall output for the same level of compensation. This risk is 
perhaps greater in environmental management problems, due to the thinness 
of the market, than in labor markets, where the number of workers can 
reduce the opportunities for collusion. 
In the environmental arena, the rank-order tournament is similar in 
nature to Xepapadeas' (1991) random penalty (or reward) mechanism. In the 
latter case, the regulatory agency randomly penalizes a firm or subset of 
firms in a region if pollution levels exceed its chosen standard. The 
individual firm has an incentive to reduce its pollution level in order to 
reduce the overall pollution level and avoid the chance that it will be 
selected for the penalty. The random assignment of the penalty avoids the 
l^Typically, this error is assumed to have two parts, one worker-
specific and the other common to all workers. These would have natural 
counterparts in an environmental setting, with the individual error 
corresponding to unobserved firm specific effort (or shirking) and the 
joint error corresponding with random environmental events, such as 
weather, that influence the overall level of environmental damage. 
l^Note here that rank-order tournaments are a rank trust. 
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need for the regulator to monitor firms individually. The rank-order 
tournament, in contrast, does require some firm-specific monitoring, in 
order to conduct the ranking. However, it replaces the uncertainty of the 
random penalty with the firm's own uncertainty regarding its relative 
position in the industry. Additional research is needed to compare the 
relative merits of these two enforcement mechanisms. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper has been to examine the use of performance 
bonds in environmental arena, taking into account the lessons on their 
limitations as seen in the labor literature. More specifically this paper 
makes three contributions. First, the paper critically evaluates the 
limitations to bonds. While limits such as government moral hazard, 
liquidity constraints, legal restrictions, source identity problems, long 
time horizons, and valuation of environmental damages pose a challenge to 
bonds, they have been implemented in case of surface coal mining with some 
success. Second, the paper identifies seven conditions under which bonds 
may work for environmental assets. They are valuation advantages, 
observability and enforceability, a limited number of participants, a fixed 
time horizon, well defined states of the world and probabilities, no 
irreversible effects and after effects, and a relatively small value of the 
bond. Third, the paper argues that the bonds are not likely to be used to 
control non-point source pollution created by agriculture. We conclude 
that even though none of the seven favorable conditions hold, liquidity 
constraint is the major limitation which makes bonds less attractive for 
the control of non-point source pollution created by agriculture. A future 
area of research would be to identify what other environmental problems fit 
into the category of mines (where environmental bonds are applicable) 
versus the category of agriculture (where environmental bonds are not 
applicable). 
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PAPER II. BUDGET BALANCING INCENTIVE MECHANISMS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The information requirements associated with many non-point source 
pollution control mechanisms represent a significant barrier to their 
practical implementation. It is typically not enough to measure the 
ambient concentration of a pollutant at a receptor site. One must also 
understand and monitor the stochastic fate and transport mechanisms that 
link the sources of pollution to the receptor site of interest [See Cabe 
and Herriges (1992) and Segerson (1988)]. This information can be costly, 
potentially offsetting the gains to society from the pollution control 
itself. In addition, traditional control devices, such as Pigouvian taxes 
and subsidies, require that each polluting agent incur the marginal damage 
associated with the regulatory agency's target level of pollution. The 
result is that these mechanisms are typically not "budget-balancing", 
collecting a multiple of damage costs from firms in the system when taxes 
are employed and requiring the regulatory agency to pay a multiple of the 
avoided damage costs to firms in the case of Pigouvian subsidies.^ 
Recent work by Xepapadeas (1991) offers a resolution to both the 
monitoring and budget balancing problems. Drawing on the moral hazard 
literature for dealing with shirking within the firm [e.g., Holmstrom 
(1982), Rasmusen (1987)], Xepapadeas develops a budget balancing incentive 
scheme that relies upon random fines assigned to at least one polluter in 
the event that the regulator's pollution target is violated.^ Budget 
balancing is achieved by then returning this fine, minus the damages to 
^Xepapadeas (1991, p. 114) defines budget-balancing control mechanisms 
in the environmental arena as contracts that allocate "... to the members of 
the discharges' group the total amount of subsidy that corresponds to any 
given deviation between desired and 'measured' ambient concentration 
levels." 
^Related research on dealing with moral hazard in the multiple agent 
setting includes Baiman and Demski (1980), Lazear and Rosen (1981), Radner 
(1980), Atkinson and Feltham (1980), Green and Stokey (1983), and Nalebuff 
and Stiglitz (1983). 
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society from non-compliance, to the remaining firms. The regulator need 
not observe the actual emissions or abatement efforts of the individual 
firms. Properly designed, this system of random fines induces firms to 
adopt the targeted level of abatement effort. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it demonstrates that, 
contrary to Xepapadeas (1991), the budget-balancing system of subsidies and 
random penalties cannot be used to induce compliance with the regulator's 
objectives if any firm within the system is risk neutral.^ However, the 
mechanism can be successfully applied if firms are sufficiently risk averse 
[Rasmusen (1987)]. Second, the paper explores the optimal design of the 
random penalty mechanism. In particular, it is shown that the mechanism 
will be effective for a wider range of firms if both the fines and the 
probabilities of receiving a fine are differentiated according to the 
firm's level of risk aversion. The paper also demonstrates that by 
subdividing a group of firms into several small partitions, compliance can 
be improved. 
^This result was demonstrated earlier by Holmstrom (1982). 
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2. THE BASIC MECHANISM 
The random penalty mechanism developed in Xepapadeas (1991) represents 
an adaptation to the environmental arena of the budget-balancing contracts 
developed in Rasmusen (1987). Whereas Rasmusen is concerned with avoiding 
shirking among agents producing a shared output, the agents in Xepapadeas 
share the gains to society from reductions in the ambient concentration of 
pollution. A key distinguishing feature between the two articles lies in 
Xepapadeas's assumption that the agents are risk neutral. This section 
reviews the system of subsidies and random penalties developed in 
Xepapadeas and extends its application to the case in which firms are risk 
averse along the lines of Rasmusen. The notation of Xepapadeas is followed 
with only minor modifications.^ 
2.1 Notation 
Consider an economy consisting of n firms (i=l,...,n) which in the 
course of their production processes contribute to the ambient 
concentration of pollution in the region. Pollution abatement effort is 
assumed to be costly, with the cost to the i^^ firm determined by the 
function C£(A^), where denotes the level of the firm's abatement effort, 
C^(0) =0, C > 0, and C" > 0. In the absence of government intervention, 
the cost minimizing firm is assumed to set its abatement effort to zero and 
to earn a profit of . The resulting ambient concentration (i.e., in the 
absence of any abatement) is given by Wq s W(0), where W(A) is the single-
valued function linking the ambient concentration of pollution to firm's 
abatement efforts A = (A^.A^ A^). It is assumed that ambient 
concentration is a non-increasing function of abatement effort, s aw/SA^ 
< 0. The regulatory agency's problem is to reduce this concentration to 
^In particular, whereas Xepapadeas (1991) considers the application of 
the random penalty mechanism over time, we restrict our attention to a 
single time period. Extending the results below to multiple time periods 
is straightforward. 
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socially optimal level of W a W(Â), where denotes the optimal level of 
abatement effort by firm i.^ Specifically, the regulator is assumed to 
choose Â so as to maximize the net benefit from production and pollution 
abatement. This maximization problem can be represented as 
Max ZilTr.O . ^(a.)] - D[W(A)] 
(Ai) 
where the summation term provides the firms' profits net abatement costs 
and D[W(A)] represents the damages associated with the ambient 
concentration W(A). It is assumed that these damages are strictly 
increasing in ambient concentration, with D' > 0 and D'' >0. The familiar 
first order conditions result, equating the marginal benefits and marginal 
costs of abatement effort; i.e., 
V 1=1 n,. (1) 
where A = 3D(W)/aW denotes the shadow cost of pollution concentration at 
the optimal concentration level. 
2.2 Budget Balancing With Risk Neutrality 
Let ^  = $[W(A)] denote the welfare gains to society resulting from 
abatement effort A and the corresponding reduction in ambient concentration 
from Wq to W(A).^ Under Xepapadeas' (1991) budget balancing contract B, 
Xepapadeas (1991) derives W and Â as the result of the social 
planner's maximization of an Arrow type (Arrow and Kurz, 1970) felicity 
function. 
%[W(Â)] corresponds to the residual social valuation of optimal 
abatement, RSB, in Xepapadeas (1991). 
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if the target level of ambient concentration is met (i.e., W < W), then the 
regulator allocates the gains to society [$ = $(W)] among firms in 
proportion to their targeted abatement level. In particular, firm i 
A 
receives the subsidy b ^  where <f>^ lies between 0 and 1 and 
In the event that the target concentration level is not met, one firm 
is randomly selected and penalized. The penalty has two components; 
(1) the firm loses its subsidy, b^, and (2) an additional fine, F^, is 
assessed against the firm.^ In order to maintain the budget balancing 
nature of the contract, these penalties, minus the welfare loss to society 
due to the higher ambient concentration, are redistributed among the 
remaining firms. 
The random penalty mechanism can be summarized in terms of the firm's 
subsidy, b^, under the program: 
6 j = (j)j^  W<W 
bj^(A) = - -F^ W>W , with probability 
b i + [6j + Fj + r(#) ] I^>W' , with probability îj , J 
( 2 )  
i 
where e [0,1] denotes the probability that firm i is penalized (with 
= 1). r[W(A)] s #[W(A)] - $ denotes the change in social welfare from 
the level targeted by the regulator (with r[W(A)] < 0 for W(A) > W), and 
i^ij s denotes share of firm j's penalty that is allocated to 
firm i. 
The contract in (2) establishes a noncooperative game among the firms 
sharing the societal gains from pollution abatement. Firm i's total profit 
It is important to note that the firm selected need not be the source 
of the excess pollution. As a result, the firm's actual abatement effort 
need not be monitored. This reduces the monitoring costs of individual 
firms. 
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is conditioned on its own level of abatement effort, as well as the 
abatement effort put forth by the other firms, denoted 
' 'An)- That is, 
+ &i(A) Vi=l,2,...n. (3) 
The question is whether the contract parameters can be designed so that 
there exists a Nash equilibrium with each firm voluntarily choosing the 
targeted level of abatement effort (Â^) and yielding the targeted ambient 
concentration [W(Â)]. 
Following Xepapadeas (1991), each firm is assumed to treat the other 
firms as being in compliance (i.e., = Â,^). Let A^ e [O.Â^) denote 
the i^^ firm's optimal "cheating abatement level." Assuming that firms are 
risk neutral, A^ is given by 
= argmax £[11^(42 ,Â_^) ] 
A^e[0,Â^) 
(4) 
where 
( 5 )  
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A firm's abatement efforts will be the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium if® 
= + ICjVi + r(W)]} -6; + [C^(Â^) 
<0 V i =1, . . . ,n 
The term measures the firm's maximum expected gains from cheating. 
Xepapadeas (1991, p. 123) notes that because is a strictly 
decreasing function of F^, there should exist a fine € (0,+œ) such that 
n^CF^) < 0." While this statement is true, it is not sufficient to ensure 
that the required series of inequalities in (6) holds simultaneously. The 
problem is that, while increasing F^ will decrease 0^, it will also 
increase fij (i.e., gOj/gF^ > 0) and potentially encourage another firm to 
cheat. In fact, Holmstrom's (1982, p. 326) Theorem 1 establishes that the 
latter effect will dominate, so that A = Â will not be a Nash equilibrium 
under contract B of Xepapadeas (1991). Rewriting this theorem in the 
current notation, we have: 
THEOREM 1. Assuming that firms are risk neutral, there does not exist a 
set of fines, shares, and penalty probabilities (i.e., ) that 
will yield the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of A = Â satisfying the 
inequality constraints in (6). 
PROOF: Holmstrom (1982), Theorem 1. Whereas Holmstrom's agents share 
output from the production process [i.e., x(a)], agents in the current 
®As noted in Xepapadeas (1991), the Nash equilibrium of the game may 
change if the firms do not assume that their counterparts are in compliance 
(i.e., A_^ = Â_^). 
- c^ul)] 
( 6 )  
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application share output from the abatement process plus the pool of 
exogenous fines (i.e., [#(A) + Holmstrom's private cost function, 
Vi(ai), corresponds to the abatement cost function C^CA^). Finally, 
whereas Holmstrom's theorem 1 applies for a generic rule, {Sj^[x(a)]), the 
random penalty mechanism relies upon specific shares [b^CA) + F^]. 
Altering the parameters of the random penalty mechanism (i.e., 
simply represent different ways to alter the "size of the pie" [i.e., x(a)] 
and the sharing rule used {i.e., s[x(a)]). Theorem 1 of Holmstrom still 
applies. Q.E.D. 
2.3 Budget Balancing With Risk Aversion 
As noted by Rasmusen (1987), the limitation of optimal sharing rules 
when firms are risk neutral lies in the linearity of the agent's objective 
function with respect to money. Even with random penalties for shirking, a 
profit maximizing firm will equate the marginal benefits from shirking (C) 
and the expected marginal penalty. Pareto optimality requires that this 
expected marginal penalty equal the marginal damage of pollution 
concentration for each firm [equation (1)]. The budget-balancing 
restriction, however, prohibits this, since the marginal damage to society 
must be shared. The insight of Rasmusen's (1987) work is that random 
penalties, when agents are sufficiently risk averse, can provide the extra 
"kick" to each agent's share of the marginal damage that is needed to 
insure compliance. Conceptually, the firm can comply and receive a certain 
return, or cheat and be forced to participate in a lottery. The greater 
the firm's risk aversion, the more they will wish to avoid the lottery by 
complying. 
Risk aversion is incorporated into the analysis by assuming that firms 
maximize the expected utility received from their profits, where utility is 
represented by the function Uj^(nj_) with U' > 0 and U" < 0. The firm's 
cheating abatement level, A^, is then determined by 
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a! = argmax 
A^e[0,A^) 
( 7 )  
where 
E&/[n^(A_^,A_j)])= - (72(A^) -F^] 
+ - c^Ui) + (6i +^ij[6j +Fj + r(w)])]) 
(8 )  
As in Rasmusen (1987), we assume that agents exhibit constant absolute risk 
where = -U"/U' > 0 measures the agent's constant absolute risk aversion. 
With risk averse firms, the system of subsidies and random penalties 
in (2) will yield the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium if 
Much of the analysis below does not depend upon this specification. 
However, some of the results use the convenient parameterization of risk in 
their proofs. 
aversion, providing a convenient parameterization of risk preferences.^ 
In particular, 11^(11^^) is given by 
(9) 
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-*i[n° - Cj^(A*) -Fj ] 
= 
+ 6^ + ^j:[6 : + F, + rc/)]] (^O) 
^ J J ) 
- Ci(Âi) + ] 
- [ - e  i  ]  
<0 V i =1,...,n 
That is, firms have an incentive to comply with the regulator's abatement 
objectives when the expected utility from non-compliance is less than the 
expected utility from compliance. 
Paralleling Rasmusen's (1987, p. 431) Proposition 1, we have 
THEOREM 2. Assuming that firms are risk averse, then for any set of 
positive fines and penalty probabilities (i.e., | F^ > 0 
and > 0 )) there exists at least one sharing rule such that the 
Pareto optimal level of abatement effort, k = k, is also a Nash equilibrium 
satisfying the inequality constraints in (10), provided: (a) that agents 
are sufficiently risk averse (i.e., 0^ is large enough for all i) or (b) 
the fines are large enough (i.e., is large enough for all i) . 
PROOF: The proof is similar to Rasmusen (1987, p. 431) and proceeds in 
three steps. First, we establish that there exists at least one sharing 
rule , satisfying the individual rationality condition: 
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> 0 Vi=l,...,n (H) 
This Inequality follows through a proof by contradiction. Suppose that a 
sharing rule as in equation (11) cannot be established. Then 
bj^ - Cj^(Â£) < -C(A^) < 0. Summing this inequality over all i yields 
$ < 2^C(Â^); i.e., the total cost of optimal abatement exceeds the total 
benefits received. This contradicts the Pareto optimality of the abatement 
effort Â.10 
The second step in the proof requires establishing that is negative 
for a sufficiently large 6^. Rewriting equation (10) yields: 
- Cj^iA*)} e,F, 
Oj = e 1 ^ [-fie ^ 
-gjûl? - Cj(A . ) + bj + .[b • + F : + r(p/) ]} (12) 
. zj J J , 
;{ n. + bj - C;(Â:) ) 
+ e ] 
The term on the outside of the square brackets is strictly positive. As 9^ 
increases, the second and third terms go to zero in the limit if the 
sharing rule satisfies the inequality constraint in equation (11). 
However, the first term has a positive exponent and goes to negative 
infinity as 6^ increases. This establishes part (a) of Theorem 2. 
The third step in the proof requires establishing that is negative 
^®If the abatement is taken up, then the Pareto optimal abatement of 
effort level implies that the total benefits to the society from abatement 
($) is higher than the total cost [Z^C(Âi)]. 
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for a sufficiently large F, where = a^ F, V i = l,...n. The constant a^ 
can be chosen by the regulator based on the i^^ firm. Consider the impact 
that an increase in all fines would have on the i^^ firm's gains from 
cheating, gO^/gF. 
ÔQ; -#2[n, - C^iA.) - a^F ] 
-âF -
Q (13) 
- Ci(A*) + + ajF + r (W)]] 
+ J J J } 
V i =1 n 
Then equation (13) can be simplified as 
50^ - Cj^(A.) - a^F ] 
— = 
dF 
(14) 
-gjCn - c^(A*) + + 4^,[6, + a -F + r(y)]] 
V i =1 n 
Let 
H = -e 
- CjCAj) -a^F ] (15) 
and 
64 
- Cj^iA*) +6i + 4^,[6, + a -F + r(y)]] (16) 
N = e J J J 
Equation (14) can be written as 
80: ^ 
_ = 
V i =1 n 
Since N > M, equation (17) implies that 
80; ^ 
_ < + EjVi 
= -9^n 
(17) 
(18) 
Therefore, a sufficient condition for 8n^/8F to be negative is that the 
term in square brackets of equation (18) be zero for all i. Since there 
are n such equations, the n unknown a^'s can be chosen by the regulator to 
satisfy these conditions. 
Now consider 8^nj^/3F^. 
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3\ 2 - CjCA*) - a^F ] 
dF^ 
V \à ,2r ^ ^ ^ ^ 
<0 V i=l n (12) 
The second order condition for the maximization of (12) shows that both the 
first term and the second term in equation (19) are negative, indicating 
that dQ^/dF is also negative. Therefore, becomes negative when F is 
sufficiently large. Q.E.D. 
The above theorem and proof deviates from Rasmusen's (1987) 
proposition 2 in two respects. First, unlike Rasmusen, Theorem 2 
identifies minimum shares that must be allocated to an individual agent. 
Specifically, the shares must satisfy 
6i > Ci(Âj) - C%(j_) V i =1 n (20) 
That is, each agent must be allocated enough of the social gains from 
optimal abatement in order to offset the cost savings from cheating. 
Equation (22) can be interpreted as saying that firms with greater cost 
savings from cheating must be allocated a greater proportion of the social 
gains from optimal abatement. The condition in equation (22) is not 
contained in (Rasmusen, 1987) because the author specifies the agent's 
utility function to be separable in money and effort, eliminating the 
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interaction between 9^ and [G^(Â^) - Cj^(A*)]. Second, we correct 
Rasmusen's (1987) proof of proposition 2(b). Rasrausen's (1987) argument in 
the current application would correspond to noting that 0^^ is strictly 
decreasing in (i.e., gO^/gF^ < 0). Hence, increasing F^ will decrease 
the first term in the square brackets of equation (12). Unfortunately, 
this proof has the same problem as seen in the previous section. 
Increasing the fine to firm i can be used to induce compliance of the i^h 
firm, but at the same time it will encourage other firms to cheat (aOj/gF^ 
> 0). However, Rasmusen's basic proposition 2(b) remains correct. The 
intuition behind the fact that compliance can be obtained by increasing F 
in case of risk averse firms is that the variance of the returns increases 
with F, even though the mean return remains the same. Since a risk averse 
firm would prefer a small variance, it would choose the certainty income 
from compliance rather than choosing the lottery income from non­
compliance . 
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3. EXTENSIONS 
Theorem 2 insures that a budget balancing system of subsidies and 
random penalties can be used to encourage compliance with the socially 
optimal abatement objectives if firms are sufficiently risk averse, but it 
provides no guidance in terms of mechanism design. This section extends 
the analysis in two directions. First, we consider how the penalty 
probabilities (i.e., the and the fines (i.e., F^'s) should be 
allocated among firms with different levels of risk aversion. Second, we 
analyze the impact that the number of firms in the regulatory group has on 
compliance. 
3.1 The Effect of Penalty Probabilities and the Fine on Compliance 
Rasmusen's (1987) budget-balancing contract assigns an equal fine and 
an equal probability of being fined in the event that the group objective 
is not met (i.e., = 1/n and F^ = F Vi=l,2,...,n). Even though 
Xepapadeas allows for the variability in he does not specify the manner 
in which the penalty probabilities should vary to optimize the mechanism's 
efficacy. Intuitively, firms with greater risk aversion require only a 
little uncertainty in order to induce compliance. Even a small variability 
in their returns caused by the cheating lottery of the random penalty 
scheme will lead them to compliance. Reducing the penalty probabilities 
for the firms with high risk aversion enables us to increase for firms 
with lower risk aversion, who rely more on expected penalty. Similarly, 
the compliance can be improved for any particular group of firms, say, the 
low risk averse firms, by increasing the fines for only the low risk averse 
firms, because increasing the fine increases the variance of the returns 
for these group of firms. 
In identifying how to differentiate penalty probabilities and the 
fines according to firm risk aversion characteristics, we proceed in three 
steps. First, we determine which firms are likely to be out of compliance, 
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i.e., who should be targeted. Second, we analyze the impact of penalty 
probabilities and fines on compliance, i.e., how to use the available 
tools. Third, we combine these results to determine how program parameter 
changes can improve its efficacy. 
To simplify our discussion, we consider a world with two types of 
firms, distinguished only in terms of their level of risk aversion and 
such that < Oy. Suppose the firms are identical in all other 
respects; i.e., = ÂQ, <f>^ = <j), C^{k^) = CfA^), and = 11, V - i. Given 
the simplifying assumptions, the compliance condition in (10) can be 
rewritten as 
- (7(A j) - Fj ] 
-9i[nO - C{A*) + 6 + —1_[6 + F . + rw]] 
- } (21) 
- c(Ao) + 6 ] 
- [-e ] 
<0 V i=L,H. 
The following Theorem establishes who should be targeted for compliance. 
THEOREM 3: Let 6-^ < 62 for firms 1 and 2. Then (a) ^ 0 implies that 
(1(02^ < 0 and (b) there exists a unique 9* such that 
0(g*) = 0. 
PROOF: Let R(k*,8) represent the risk premium, defined as the amount of 
dollars that would make a firm (with a risk aversion coefficient of #) 
indifferent between receiving the random outcome from cheating and 
certainty equivalent income. 
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E[n^(A*,Â_^)] - (22) 
That is, R(A^, 9) is implicitly defined by 
£•{£/[n_j(A*, A__^)]} = £7te[n_^(i_j,A__^)] - JZ(A*,g)) (23) 
Now, suppose that n^Cgi) < 0, where 0^(6) denotes the value of for a 
firm with risk aversion coefficient 6. Using the equation (23) in the 
definition of 0^(#2) yields 
î 7 t e [ n _ i ( Â _ i , Â _ i ) ]  -  R ( A * , e i ) } < 0  (24) 
Using the property of increasing utilities, equation (24) implies 
E[n^(Âj,Â_j)]  - R ( A * , e i )  -  nj(Âj,Â_^) < o (25) 
Replacing 9-^ with ^2 equation (25) and using Pratt's (1964) Theorem 1, 
3R/35 > 0, we get 
E[n_£(Â_£,  A_j^)]  -  r(a^,92) " nj(Â_^,Â_j)  < o (26)  
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Again, using the strictly increasing property of utility function (i.e., 
U' >0), equation (26) implies that 
< o (27) 
Equation (27) implies that 0(^2) < 0. This completes proof of part (a) of 
Theorem 3. 
To prove part (b) of Theorem 3, consider two firms, distinguished only 
in terms of their level of risk aversion. Let g2 represent the risk 
aversion coefficient of high risk averse firm and represent the risk 
aversion coefficient of low risk averse firm such that < #2" the 
theory of continuity, if there exists a 0^ such that fl(0]^) > 0 and a #2 
such that 0(^2) < 0> then there is a threshold level of. 6 = 6* such that 
the firm is indifferent between compliance and non-compliance. But now we 
need to prove that there exists a such that n(ôj^) > 0 and a 62 such that 
0(#2) < 0. According to Theorem 2, for any set of positive fines and 
probabilities, there exists a large enough 6 = 62, such that 0(#^) < 0. 
Theorem 1 ensures that there exists a small enough # = such that 
0(#j) > 0. Finally, the uniqueness of 9 = 9* is guaranteed by Theorem 3a, 
because once 0 becomes negative, it always remains strictly 
negative. Q.E.D. 
Now that we know which firms are most likely to be in non-compliance, 
we need to examine the tools available for indulging them into compliance. 
Suppose that the regulator begins by treating all firms identically. Given 
equal probabilities of detection for all the firms (^^ = ^ = 1/n) and equal 
fines (F^ = F), can be written as 
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- C(A*) - F ] 
- CCA*) + b + _J—[6 + F + r(M)]] 
- (lb ("-!) } (28) 
-6^[n° - c(Ao) + 6 ] 
- [ -e ] 
<0 V i=L,H. 
Now, consider the effect of a change in on compliance, 
aOj -ej^llP - C(A*) - F 
= - e 
-6  :  [n° - CCA*) + 6 + —L_ [b + F + r(y) ] 
+ e ° (n-1) 
-fiCnO - CCA*) + b + -J—[b + F + r(y)]] 
= e " (n-l) 
9,[F + b + —L_[b + F + ?(#)]] 
[1 - e (n-l) 
(29) 
The sign of equation (29) depends on the sign of the term inside the square 
brackets, since the term outside the square brackets is positive. Since 
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+ 6 + __2_.[6+F + r(#)]] (30) 
e (n-1) > I 
equation (29) is negative. This implies that increasing will move that 
firm towards compliance. This result is expected, since increasing the 
probability of detection increases the incentive to comply with the 
regulations. 
Consider how the fines can be changed to accomplish compliance. 
Equations (20) and (21) show that the compliance can be increased by 
imposing greater fines on all firms. If we now change the fine only for a 
subgroup of firms, say the low risk firms, they will all the more be led 
towards compliance, since they do not have the gain from increasing the 
fine of the other group. 
Intuitively, there exist four possible cases of compliance when 
shifting the probability of detection from high risk averse firms to low 
risk averse firms and increasing the fines. 
Case 1: Both high risk averse firm and the low risk averse firm 
comply with the regulations, i.e., 0% < 0 and < 0. 
Case 2 : Both high risk averse firm and the low risk averse firm do 
not comply with the regulations, i.e., 0^ > 0 and > 0. 
Case 3: The low risk averse firm complies with the regulation and 
the high risk averse firm does not comply with the 
regulations, i.e. , > 0 and < 0. 
Case 4; The high risk averse firm complies with the regulation and 
the low risk averse firm does not comply with the 
regulations, i.e., 0^ < 0 and fj^ > 0. 
In case 1, when both the firms comply with the regulations, there is no 
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need to shift the probability and the fines. In case 2, both the firms can 
never be made to comply with the regulations, since, there is less 
incentive to comply when shifting the probability of detection away from a 
particular firm and the probability of detection should be one when summed 
over all the firms. Case 3 cannot exist, since by theorem 3, with equal 
probability and shares, when the low risk averse firm complies with the 
regulation, the high risk averse firm should also comply with the 
regulations. This can also be seen from Figure 1, which plots the 
compliance condition 0^^. It can be observed from Figure 1 that once 
becomes negative, it never becomes positive again. This indicates that 
case 3 can not exist. Therefore, the target for compliance are the low 
risk averse firms as in case 4. Therefore, by shifting the probability of 
detection and the fine (F) towards the low risk averse firm, 
compliance can be improved. 
3.2 The Effect of Number of Firms on Compliance 
Assume the regulator has the option of choosing between a single 
"team" and subdividing them into small teams of n identical firms. There 
are some advantages and disadvantages to this subdivision of a group of 
firms. Intuitively, the increase in the number of firms has two effects. 
The increase in the number of firms reduces the probability of detection, 
since only, one firm gets caught in the event that the actual environmental 
quality falls below the optimal level. This reduces the firm's incentive 
to comply with the regulations. This first effect is essentially a free 
rider problem owing to large group size. At the same time, however, the 
increase in the number of firms reduces the share of the i^^ firm from the 
lost share of the firm and the fine paid by the j firm, in the event 
that the firm gets caught when the standards are not met. That is, the 
benefit due to cheating goes down as the number of firms increases, 
inducing the firms to comply with the regulations. This result can be 
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thêta 
Figure 1. The effect of risk aversion on compliance 
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thought of as a risk spreading effect in which the same risk is shared by a 
greater group. Therefore, the effect of change in the number of firms on 
the compliance depends on the size of these two opposing forces. In fact 
it can be shown that in the case of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
utility functions the former effect dominates the latter, thereby the 
compliance can be improved by dividing the total number of participants (n) 
into several small subgroups. This leads to the following theorem. 
THEOREM 4: The compliance can be improved in the case of CARA utility 
functions by subdividing the total number of participants (n) into several 
small groups (i.e., dCi/dn > 0) . 
PROOF: Assume there exist 'n' identical firms in the economy. Then the 
compliance condition for pollution control can be written as 
-Û [n° - ccÂQ) +6] 1 -& [n° - -f] 
n = e  - _ e  
n 
, -« [n° -c(A').5,(_L)|b.F*r(K)]] 
0 n-l <0 
n 
From equation (31) it can be seen that the compliance decision is a 
function of n. Consider the partial of 0 with respect to n, that is. 
where 
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s a  1  - « [ n "  
-g [n° - c(A*)+b + _l_[6+F+r(Ar)]] 
(J_)e "-1 
n 
-e [n° - (7(A*) +6 + (—)[b*F+r(w)]] 
-( — )e 
n 
1 
(l-n)2 
[b+F + r ( W ) ]  
9 [F + b + —[b+F+r(W)] ] 
ie "-1 
- [1+  [b+F+r(W)]]} 
(n-1) 
= a P 
9  [F + b + —[b+F + r ( , W ) ]  ]  
a - e 
-[1+ _2_^[b+F+r(iy)]] 
(n-1) 
(32) 
-g [n° - c(A*)+6 +JL[6+F+r(:y)]] C^^) 
(J_)a "-1 
n 
(34) 
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and 
[n° - C(A*)+Ê+_L[5+F + rW]] 
(J-)e (35) 
n 
Since P > 0, the sign of dQ/dn depends on the sign of a. However 
where 
lLL[b.F.E^] 
- ri+ 
(n-l) 
n6 
a = {e n  [1 "  ^  [b+F+r(W)]]} 
[b+F+nW) 
>{e (n- l )  -  [1+  [b+F+r(y ) ] ] }  ^  ^  
(n-l) 
= f(-Z^[b+F+r(C/)]) 
(n-l) 
f(x) = - (1+x) (37) 
Since f(0) = 0, and f'(x) = e^ - 1 > 0 for x > 0, then f(x) > 0, for x > 0. 
Therefore, with 
[b+F+r( l7 ) ]  >  0  
(n-l) (38) 
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a > 0, which in turn implies that an/3n >0. Q.E.D. 
The effect of the number of firms on compliance has several policy 
implications. As per Theorem 4, compliance can be achieved effectively by 
dividing n into several small groups. But, there are some limitations to 
subdividing n into small groups. First, the cost of monitoring the ambient 
concentration goes up as n becomes small, because each subdivision requires 
the monitoring of ambient concentration. Second, the administrative cost 
of managing such groups will be high. Third, a small team size also 
increases the potential for collusion. Therefore, these limitations should 
be taken into account during the implementation of subdivision to small 
groups. 
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4. APPLICATION TO NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
The information requirements associated with non-point source 
pollution control is a major huddle for successful implementation. It is 
difficult the identify the contribution of individual entities towards the 
cause for the ambient concentration in the region. The random penalty 
mechanism discussed in this paper not only overcomes the problems due to 
monitoring costs but also balances the budget associated with pollution 
control. 
Consider the example of groundwater pollution in the case of 
developing countries. In countries such as India and Pakistan agriculture 
is heavily dependent on the monsoon. Since the monsoons are periodical in 
these countries, it is common to store the rain water in natural ponds 
called "tank" and reuse the water for purpose of irrigation through 
gravitational force. The gravitational application water from the head end 
farmers (farmers who are closer to the tanks) to the tail end farmers 
(farmers who are away from the tank) often leads to both groundwater 
contamination and soil erosion in the entire cultivated area. It is 
difficult to identify the contribution of each farmer towards groundwater 
contamination in the region. 
With the introduction of random penalty mechanism, the problems due to 
monitoring each of the individual farms can be avoided. Under the 
described groundwater pollution environment, the regulator has to monitor 
the level the groundwater pollution for the entire region and either 
penalize or reward the individual farms based on the level of ambient 
concentration for the region as a whole. When the level of groundwater 
pollution for the region is below the optimal level, then each producer 
will receive a share of the increased benefit due to pollution control. If 
the level of groundwater pollution exceeds the optimal concentration, then 
one of the producers will be selected at random and penalized with a fine. 
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The rest of the producers will receive a share of the remaining increased 
welfare and a part of the fine. 
Even though this mechanism has the dual advantages of greatly reducing 
monitoring costs and budget balancing, the apparent inequity of the 
incentive scheme represents a likely barrier to its implementation. In 
particular, under this mechanism, both compliant and the non-noneompliant 
firms have a nonzero probability of being penalized. The political 
viability of random penalties is questionable given this seeming inequity. 
Furthermore, the ability of the regulator to fine tune either the fines or 
the penalty probabilities according to the risk preferences of individual 
firms will be difficult given the lack of information on individual risk 
preferences. Finally, if in fact some firms are risk neutral, budget 
balancing and firm compliance cannot be simultaneously achieved. However, 
the mechanism can still be used to reduce the overall cost of abatement to 
the regulator. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The random penalty mechanism proposed by Xepapadeas (1991) offers a 
resolution to both the monitoring and budget balancing problems. This 
paper revisits the random penalty mechanism and makes three primary 
contributions to the existing literature. First, the paper shows that risk 
aversion is a necessary condition to attain compliance in the case of 
budget balancing with random fines, which contradicts Xepapadeas's (1991) 
arguments. Second, we show that Rasmusen's (1987) compliance set for the 
social objectives can be expanded by shifting the probability of detection 
and fines from high risk averse firms to low risk averse firms. Third, we 
show that the increase in the number of firms has a negative effect on 
compliance. These results have important policy implications. 
Specifically, more firms can be made to comply with the social objectives 
by shifting the probability of detection and the fines toward less risk 
averse firms. Compliance can also be improved by subdividing a group of 
firms into several small partitions. 
Although, the random penalty mechanism has many advantages, it also 
has some limitations. First, while the risk aversion is a necessary 
condition to achieve compliance it is difficult to the observe the risk 
averse nature of the participants. Second, when fines are increased to 
achieve compliance, the liquidity constraints could potentially limit the 
size of the fine that can be imposed on the firms. Third, even thouE;h the 
number of the participating firms (n) can be decreased to achieve 
compliance, limitations such as collusion, increased monitoring costs, and 
increased administrative costs should also be considered. 
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PAPER III. ENVIRONMENTAL RANK ORDER TOURNAMENTS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although numerous mechanisms have been proposed for controlling 
pollution, they have met with limited success to date. One of the barriers 
to successful implementation is the information requirements associated 
with traditional control mechanisms. Instruments such as Pigouvian 
taxation and environmental bonds require knowledge of the marginal damage 
costs imposed on the society by individual firms and the constant 
monitoring of each firm's pollution emissions. The cost of obtaining this 
information can be prohibitive. Xepapadeas (1991) has proposed a random 
penalty scheme that requires considerably less information, with individual 
firms collected into "teams". If the total ambient concentration generated 
by the team exceeds the optimal level set by the regulator, the mechanism 
randomly selects and fines a single firm. Detailed data on firm specified 
emissions are not necessary. One problem with this approach is that both 
compliant and non-compliant firms have a non-zero probability of being 
penalized. While the mechanism can theoretically induce compliance, it may 
not be politically appealing due to this apparent lack of "fairness". This 
chapter focusses on Rank order tournaments (ROTs) as an alternative 
pollution control mechanism that avoids this fairness issue, while reducing 
the information collection costs associated with traditional pollution 
control mechanisms. 
Rank order tournaments were first proposed by Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
in the labor literature as a mechanism for controlling worker shirking 
under imperfect monitoring. The application of ROT to pollution control 
involves making firms compete with each other to reduce each firm's 
pollution emission, thereby keeping the total ambient concentration at the 
optimal level. Firms are ranked on the basis of their pollution control 
effort or a proxy that represents the pollution emissions. There is no 
need to monitor the individual firms to measure their actual pollution 
emissions. Thus, rank order tournaments limit the information requirement 
by ranking the firms depending on pollution control effort. 
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The purpose of this paper is to apply ROTs to environmental problems. 
We compare the ROT with the Pigouvian tax in terms of both efficiency and 
practicality. We identify the conditions under which both Pigouvian taxes 
and ROTs yield the same level of pollution control effort in the case of 
risk neutral firms when the transformation function of effort to abatement 
is nonlinear and firm level emissions are unobservable. We consider both 
the fixed reward scheme and the flexible penalty scheme to provide 
incentives for the firms to invest effort optimally in pollution control. 
As an example, the application of ROTs to the control non-point source 
pollution is evaluated. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 
reviews the development of ROTs in the labor literature. Section 3 lays 
out a framework for environmental ROTs and demonstrates that both Pigouvian 
taxes and ROTs can be designed to yield the same socially optimal 
allocation of effort by individual firms in controlling pollution. Section 
4 compares ROTs and Pigouvian taxes in terms of their information 
requirements, and section 5 analyzes the conditions under which an 
environmental ROT may fail and how they relate to limitations of labor 
tournaments. The implications of ROTs for non-point source pollution 
control are discussed in section 6 and section 7 concludes the paper. 
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2, LITERATURE REVIEW ON RANK ORDER TOURNAMENTS 
The theory of rank order tournaments was developed in the labor 
literature on the basis of real-world examples, such as competition for a 
managerial position among a group of employees, professional golf 
tournaments, horse races, and grading in the class room. Under this 
compensation scheme competitors are ranked based on some observable 
qualities or quantities, and are rewarded based on their rank. The goal of 
ROTs in the context of labor literature is to induce the optimal level of 
effort on the part of workers. The labor literature compares ROTs to piece 
rate system in terms of efficiency and cost of implementation with the 
assumptions that output is observable and that effort cannot be directly 
measured without costly monitoring. In general, compensation schemes based 
on rank order require less monitoring and are therefore less expensive to 
implement than schemes that use piece rates based on output. 
2.1 Tournaments Versus Piece Rates 
The seminal article on rank order tournaments was written by Lazear 
and Rosen (1981). Therein, the authors assume that the output of workers 
is observable, but that their effort is unobservable. The workers can 
influence output by investing more in effort. The relationship between the 
worker's output, qj, and their investment in training (e.g., education), 
/ij, is assumed to be linear. Specifically, 
qj = /ij + y (1) 
where ej denotes the realization of the random factor, or shock, with a 
mean zero and a variance . The random factor can be thought of as 
lifetime luck, such as an ability factor, which is revealed slowly over the 
worker's lifetime. Investment is chosen by the worker prior to the 
realization of this random factor. The individual worker's cost of 
investment is given by C(/i) with C , C ' >0. The random term cj is 
assumed to be i.i.d. across individuals. 
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Lazear and Rosen (1981) begin by identifying the optimal piece rate 
incentive. Let r be the piece rate paid by the firm to the worker for each 
unit of output produced. The risk neutral worker chooses a level of effort 
to maximize their expected net return, i.e., 
E[rq - C(/i)] = r/i - C(p) . 
The first-order condition for this maximization is given by 
That is, the worker continues to put forth effort until the piece rate just 
offsets their marginal cost, or disutility, from effort. The firm, on the 
other hand, receives an expected net profit from employing the worker of 
where V is the value of unit output to the firm. Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
argue that, in the long run, free entry and competition among workers will 
force profits to zero, with V = r. Thus, in the case of risk neutral 
workers, the piece rate system involves paying each worker the marginal 
value of their product. Combining this result with equation (2) yields the 
usual optimality condition: 
i.e., marginal cost of investment is equated to its marginal social return. 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) then demonstrate that a rank order tournament 
can be designed to yield the same level of effort as the optimal piece 
rate. In particular the authors consider a case of ROTs with two players. 
A fixed prize of is awarded to the winner and a consolation prize W2 is 
r = C'(/i). ( 2 )  
E(Vq - rq) = (V - r)/i 
C'(/i) = V (3) 
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awarded to the loser, where winning is determined by the largest drawing of 
q. Lazear and Rosen show that the worker's incentives to invest increases 
with the spread between and W2. With zero profit condition again 
imposed on the firms by competition, this ROT can be designed to yield the 
same first-order conditions and level of effort on the part of workers. 
Lazear and Rosen conclude that in the case of risk neutral workers 
both tournaments and piece rates can achieve efficient allocation of 
resources. In the case of risk averse workers, however, the efficiency of 
tournaments over piece rate depends on the form of the utility function 
assumed, the cost structure of investment, and income level of the workers. 
If there is heterogeneity in the labor force and the ability of the workers 
is known, there exists a competitive handicap system that can be used to 
achieve efficiency. 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983b) continue the discussion of rank order 
tournaments, emphasizing that there are three desirable conditions for the 
successful use of ROTs in the labor arena: 1) the worker's input is not 
directly observable, 2) there is a stochastic relationship between the 
input and output, and 3) the stochastic disturbances which affect the 
relationship between input and output of different workers must be 
correlated. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983a) show that a tournament performs 
better than the individualistic reward structures when there is a large 
source of uncertainty that is common among the agents. Green and Stokey 
(1983) also show that, if there are a large number of agents, a principal 
who cannot observe the common shock terra can do as well as one who observes 
the common shock, by adopting the tournament compensation scheme. 
Intuitively this makes sense, since the common shock term has no impact on 
the rank order of firms. 
Green and Stokey (1983) extended Lazear and Rosen's work to multiple 
agents using order statistics. One risk neutral principal and many risk 
averse agents were modelled to compare the rank ordex tournaments and piece 
rate systems. It is shown that if there exists a common shock term to all 
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the agents, tournaments will perform better than the piece rate system, but 
in the absence of a common error term optimal piece rates dominate optimal 
tournaments. In the absence of a common error, the output of the other 
agents convey no information about the effort level of an agent. The use 
of ROTs under such a case only introduces extraneous noise into the payoff 
function that agent faces. The paper by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983b) is 
another contribution to the multi-agent, single principal problems in the 
field of compensation based on relative performance. They study the design 
of contests, including absolute verses relative performance standards and 
the optimal use of prizes versus punishments. Nalebuff and Stiglitz also 
demonstrate that competition provides a high incentive level even at a low 
level of risk aversion, but competition based on relative performance has 
the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in 
the economic environment. 
Malcomson (1986) extends the multiagent results by deriving results 
similar to those in Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
(1983b), but without assumptions on the separability of agents' utility 
functions in income and action and without assumptions on the risk 
preferences of the principal and agents. The author also shows that for 
any non-linear piece rate, there exists an equivalent rank order contract. 
Carmichael (1983) analyzed the payments based on rank order tournaments in 
an agent-agents problem. The principal himself is assumed to be an agent 
once the wage function has been established. 
Rosen (1986) combines the economic efficiency of tournaments and 
experimental design for ranking contestants. He investigates the incentive 
properties of prizes in sequential elimination events, where rewards are 
increasing upon survival. He concludes that extra weight on top-ranking 
prizes is required to induce competitors to aspire to higher goals 
independent of past achievements. O'Keeffe et al. (1984) analyzed 
eliciting the right level of effort from agents when contestants have 
unequal ability. The workers were assumed to be risk neutral. While, 
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Lazear and Rosen (1981) did consider the problem of heterogeneous 
contestants with monitoring precision exogenously determined, O'Keeffe et 
al. allow monitoring precision to be a choice variable. 
2.2 Limitations to Tournaments 
Most of the work on tournaments to date has compared them with piece 
rates in terms of efficiency. Drago and Turnbull (1988), however, focussed 
their analysis on three situations where tournaments may fail: 1) when 
effort can be precisely inferred from output, 2) when sabotage arises among 
competitors, and 3) when helping efforts or aid to co-workers exist. The 
authors also consider the impact of "team externalities" on the efficacy of 
tournaments where team externaility implies that each actor's efforts have 
direct effect on another actor's output. They demonstrate that the welfare 
associated with optimal tournaments falls in the presence of these 
externalities if and only if the workers are risk averse. 
Dye (1984) likewise identifies three circumstances under which 
tournaments may fail: 1) when one of the agents is twice as productive as 
the other, but the principal believes them to be of identical ability, 2) 
when tournaments are subject to a form of Instability induced by the 
introduction of other compensation schemes, and 3) when the possibility of 
collusion among tournament players arises because their numbers are few. 
2.3 Empirical Evidence Related to Tournaments 
An experimental study comparing rank order tournaments and piece 
rates, was conducted by Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987). While the mean 
effort levels chosen by 225 subjects converged to their theoretical 
equilibrium levels in piece rates and symmetric tournaments, the variance 
of tournament induced effort levels were large when compared to their piece 
rate counter parts. However, the experimental results generally supported 
the theory of tournaments. The authors attribute two-thirds of the 
additional variance in tournaments to the strategic behavior, as opposed to 
simple maximization and the remaining one-third of the variance to 
computational difficulty involved in tournaments. Drago and Heywood (1989) 
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state that believing that one-third of the variance is due to computational 
difficulty is an overstatement, which implies that variance due to 
strategic behavior is understated by Bull et al. 
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) use non-experimental data to test 
whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses. They focus on the 
Professional Golf Tournaments, due to the availability of information on 
the prize distribution and measures of individual output. The authors 
arrive at the conclusion that the level and structure of prize money do 
t influence player's performance. Specifically, they conclude that higher 
prize money attracts better players. 
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3. ENVIRONMENTAL RANK ORDER TOURNAMENTS 
In this section, we consider the application of rank order tournaments 
to environmental arena as mechanism for achieving a target level of 
pollution abatement. In the labor arena, Lazear and Rosen (1981) assume 
that the effort applied is unobservable and that output is observable, 
whereas in the environmental arena the reverse is most likely to be true; 
i.e., 'the level of pollution contributed by a single firm is usually 
unobservable but their abatement effort (or some indicators of effort) is 
often observable. In particular, we assume that there exists an effort 
index comprised of observable proxy qualities or quantities in pollution 
abatement.1 For example, in the case of soil erosion, it is difficult to 
measure the actual level of sedimentation generated by an individual 
farmer. However, components of an erosion control effort index are 
observable, such as the type of plow used for cultivation, the construction 
of contours, the use of strip cropping, and the variety of crops grown. 
The effort index provides the basis for the rank order tournaments. 
The next section develops a framework to explore alternative abatement 
mechanisms. The Pigouvian subsidies/taxes are then discussed as the base 
case. This is followed by the discussion of ROTs with a Fixed Reward 
Scheme. As a solution to collusion problems discussed in the Fixed Reward 
Scheme, a Flexible Penalty Scheme is also introduced. 
3.I Framework 
In developing environmental ROTs, we follow Lazear and Rosen's (1981) 
basic structure, with three changes. First, contrary to Lazear and Rosen 
it is assumed that the overall level of pollution (output) is unobservable 
and pollution abatement effort (or an index of effort based on proxy 
qualities or quantities) is observable. Second, Lazear and Rosen assume 
This index can be viewed as a pollution abatement production 
function. The idea of using proxies to determine the effort index is 
discussed in detail in the section on Implications to Non-point Source 
Pollution Control using the examples of soil erosion and groundwater 
pollution. 
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that output is linearly related to effort, with the ranking of the agents 
based upon output. Here the effort index is assumed to be nonlinearly 
related to actual abatement, and the ranking of the firm depends on the 
effort index. Third, Lazear and Rosen use a fixed reward structure in 
their ROT to induce optimal effort, whereas we consider both a fixed reward 
structure and a flexible penalty scheme to induce socially optimal effort 
by the firms. A key characteristic of the flexible penalty scheme is that 
it not only increases the probability of getting caught when the firm 
engages in suboptimal pollution abatement, but also increases the size of 
the penalty based on the ambient concentration for the region. This 
reduces the incentive for collusion among firms, since collusion activity 
increases the average penalty received by all the firms. 
Consider an economy with two firms (i=l,2) that in the course of 
production emit pollution into the environment. Let represent the 
profit of the i^  ^firm if it puts forth no pollution control effort. Let 
represent the actual pollution abatement by the firm i and Idenote an 
index of the i^  ^firm's effort to control pollution. Again, consider the 
case of soil erosion. The Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE), which has 
been used extensively to quantify typical erosion levels on agricultural 
lands, would provide a simple and natural basis for constructing I^ . The 
USLE measures the erosion potential of a plot of land in terms of 
observable farm characteristics, such as the rainfall in the region, the 
slope and length of the land, support practices employed on the farm, the 
crops planted, and basic soil characteristics. More complex models, 
capturing the dynamics of soil erosion, could be used to refine this effort 
index.2 Cross compliance provides a real world example of an indexing 
scheme, under which land owners farming on a highly erodable land are 
required to apply a suitable soil conservation plan (Sinner, 1990). 
The relation between A^  and is assumed to be of the form 
S^ee, for example, the AGNPS model developed in Young et al. (1989) and 
the SEDEC model developed in Bouzaher et al. (1990). 
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= f(Iî) + i = 1, 2. (4) 
where f(I^ ) is the non-linear transformation of effort to abatement and 
is the random factor with ~ N(0,a g). In the example of soil erosion 
due to agriculture, would include the influence of weather on the 
success of a farm's social erosion control efforts. When there is heavy 
rain or wind, immediately after plowing the land, then there will be heavy 
soil erosion when compared to a situation with no rainfall. The error term 
would also capture variations in the care and ability of individual 
farmers. 
Finally, let 0(1^ ) represent the cost of pollution abatement effort 
(an index containing a vector of elements), with C'(I^ ) > 0, C"(I^ ) > 0, 
and C(0) =• 0. The profit maximization problem of the firm is then given by 
Max n. = nP - G(I.) i - 1, 2. 
li 
Since 0(1^ ) negatively contributes toward profits, with no government 
intervention a profit maximizing firm's optimal pollution abatement effort 
will be zero.^  
3.2 Pigoiivian Tax as a Comparative Benchmark 
In this subsection, we consider the Pigouvian tax and subsidy as a 
benchmark control mechanism to compare with rank order tournaments. We 
will later discuss ROT-Fixed Reward Scheme and Flexible Penalty Scheme as 
alternatives. 
The additive nature of is a necessary condition for the following 
results. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983a) show that in the case of non-linear 
multiplicative error term, the first best solution can not be achieved with 
tournaments. The reason behind the sub-optimal solution in the presence of 
multiplicative error term is that the tournament may not be able to 
replicate the marginal incentives corresponding to the first-best effort. 
T^his formulation ignores the fact that the pollution might have 
negative effects on the firm itself, although C(I) can be viewed as net cost, 
i.e., taking into account of firm's direct benefit from abatement. 
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3.2.1 Pigouvlan subsidy or tax 
A Pigouvian tax or subsidy can be administered to make the firm choose 
the socially optimal effort level of pollution abatement. The choice 
between a tax or a subsidy depends on the property right to pollute the 
environment. If firms hold the property right to pollute, they should be 
rewarded with a subsidy for pollution abatement. But, if the society 
controls the right to pollute, firms should be charged a tax on pollution 
emissions. 
For now, consider a Pigouvian subsidy in a two-firm economy. The 
administration of a Pigouvian subsidy in the environmental arena is 
equivalent to the piece rate system of paying workers in Lazear and Rosen 
(1981). Let s denote the subsidy awarded by the regulator to both firms 1 
and 2 for each unit abatement of pollution. With the Pigouvian subsidy, 
the firm's profits are given by 
The total profit of the firm is the sum of profits with no abatement and 
total subsidy due to pollution abatement pollution minus abatement costs. 
Substituting equation (4) into equation (5), and using the fact that 
E(e^ ) = 0, the firm's expected profits are given by 
Assuming risk neutrality, the first-order condition for profit maximization 
implies 
% = + sA^  - C(Ii) i = 1, 2. (5) 
E(ni) = nP + sfdi) - C(Ii) i = 1, 2. (6) 
s = C'(Ii)/f'(Ii) i = 1. 2. (7) 
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as long as f'(I) is not equal to 0.^  The firm sets marginal benefit of 
effort [sf'CI^ )] equal to the marginal cost of effort [C'(Ij^ )]. 
Let A represent the marginal value of pollution abatement. The 
objective of the social planner is to solve 
Max E(M) = - C(Ii) + - Cfig)) + A[f(Ij^ ) + fCIg)] 
i - 1, 2. (8) 
where E(M) represents the expected welfare gains to society from production 
and pollution abatement, computed as a sum of the net profits of the two 
firms and society's welfare gains from abatement by the two firms. The 
resulting first-order condition can be rearranged to yield 
A = C'(Ii)/f'(Ii), i = 1, 2. (9) 
That is, the social marginal value to abatement equals private marginal 
cost. By setting the firm's marginal Pigouvian subsidy (s) equal to 
marginal value of abatement (A), the pollution control authority can 
encourage firms to mimic society's first order conditions in equation (9), 
and hence society's choice of optimal abatement effort: 
C'(Ii)/f'(Ii) = s. i = 1, 2. (10) 
= A. 
Alternatively, if the property right belongs to the society, a per 
unit Pigouvian tax (t) could be imposed on the pollution emissions of the 
firm. The expected profit of the firm with the Pigouvian tax is given by 
All the first-order conditions assume interior solutions. It is 
possible that the corner solutions could exist, in which case the equality 
in equation (6) would be replaced by an inequality. 
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Max - nP - t[Xi0 - - C(Ii) i - 1, 2. (11) 
li 
where t is the marginal emissions tax rate, X Q^ represents the pollution 
emission by firm i with no effort at abatement (i.e., - 0), and [X^ Q -
f(I^ )] is the expected net emissions from firm i after abatement. For 
simplicity, assume there is a one-to-one relation between the pollution 
emission and abatement. The first-order condition implies that 
t = C'(Ii)/f'(Ii). i = 1, 2. (12) 
Again, the regulator can induce firms to behave optimally by setting the 
marginal tax equal to the marginal social gains from abatement (t = A). 
Since a profit maximizing firm sets t = C'(I^ )/f'(I^ ), this induces optimal 
effort by firms, with C(l£)/f'(I^ ) = t = A. 
3.3 Rank Order Tournaments 
In this section, we consider ROTs as an alternative pollution control 
scheme. If ROTs can be shown to induce the same efficient socially optimal 
effort as that of the Pigouvian tax, then, given that ranking firms require 
less information than assessing levels of pollution emissions, ROTs will 
lead to cost savings relative to either a Pigouvian subsidy or tax. 
3.3.1 A Fixed Reward Scheme 
Consider two firms polluting the environment, with the regulator 
setting up a tournament between them in order to control pollution. Let 
the firms follow the pollution abatement effort as given by equation (4). 
Let Py be the prize for the winner and Pj^  be the prize for the loser. The 
firms will be ranked on the basis of their pollution abatement effort, with 
the firm with highest abatement being chosen as the winner of the game. 
This is a Rank Order Tournament, since winning depends on the firm's effort 
rank and not on their actual abatement level. Let A = Aj^  + A2 represent 
the optimal total abatement level, where indicates the optimal abatement 
of firm i. For the purpose of budget balancing, the prizes Py and P^  can 
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be set such that 
+ Pl = A A (13) 
where, again, A represents the unit value of pollution abatement to 
society. The regulator needs to know A. This scheme is called a fixed 
reward scheme because the prizes Py and P^  are fixed depending on A and are 
not functions of the current level of abatement. Once the prizes are set 
up, the firms will increase expenditure on pollution abatement effort until 
the marginal cost of effort equals the marginal impact of that effort on 
their expected prize. Since the prizes are precommitted by the regulator, 
this scheme eliminates the moral hazard problem on the regulator side. 
That is, the regulator does not have the opportunity to decrease the value 
of the prizes, once the firms have put forth adequate abatement control 
efforts. 
The prizes Py and Pj^  should be set to induce firms choose the optimal 
abatement levels A^  and Ag. ^ 
Consider the i^  ^risk neutral firm's expected profits under this ROT 
scheme: 
nP + f [Pw - Cdi)] + (1-/3) [PL - Cdi)]. (14) 
Equation (14) can be simplified as 
Il9 + f P% + (1-/9) Pl - Cdi) i = 1, 2. (15) 
where p is the probability of winning the prize Py, with 
A potential problem with this approach is that it provides a conducive 
environment for collusion, since the firms can receive the predetermined P^  
and PT , even if all the firms put forth minimal or no effort to control 
pollution. 
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= Prob(Ai > Ag). (16) 
The firms can influence the probability of winning the prize Py by 
investing more in pollution control. But there is a trade-off between 
winning the prize Py and committing effort towards pollution abatement. 
By substituting equation (4) into (16) for Aj^ , we get: 
- Prob([f(Ii) - fXIg)] > [£2 " <1]) 
= Prob([f(Ii) - f(l2)] > w) 
= G[f(Ii) - fflg)] (17) 
where w = ^ 2 " 1^> E(w) = 0, Var(w) =• 2 a ,  and G is the cumulative 
distribution function for w. 
Each firm will choose to maximize (15). The corresponding first-
order necessary condition is given by 
(Pw - PL)(af / aii) - c'di) = 0 (18) 
This condition will also be sufficient if the following second-order 
condition holds : 
(Pw - PL)(a2f / 31^ 2) . C'dj) <0 i = 1. 2. (19) 
It can be seen from equation (18) that the spread (Py - Pj^ ) plays a 
key role in determining optimal level of effort. As the spread increases 
there is more incentive for the firms to invest in pollution control, 
because the gains due to winning increase with the spread. Offsetting this 
incentive is the increasing marginal cost of abatement effort. 
The notion of Nash equilibrium is crucial for an understanding of the 
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market failures. Consider an economy with two persons, where the two 
individuals each hold zero conjectures about the effects of their 
optimizing choice on the choice of the other. The solution, at which each 
has maximized utility subject to a belief about the level of the other's 
behavior, and those beliefs are realized is the Nash equilibrium. A zero 
conjecture implies that one agent believes that his optimizing behavior 
does not influence the behavior of the other agent. In this context, firm 
2 takes the investment by firm 1 as given in determining its best response 
level. By taking the derivative of equation (17) with respect to I^ , we 
get 
ap/aii = aG[f(ii) - f(i2)]/aii = g[f(ii) - fdg)] f'di) > o (20) 
where g(.) represents the probability density function of w. By 
substituting equation (20) into (18), firm I's implicit reaction function 
can be derived as^  
g[f(ii) - fda)] f'di) (Pw - Pl> - c'(ii) = 0 (21) 
The firm 2's reaction function is symmetrical to (21). When the Nash 
solution exists, symmetry implies that Ij^  = Ig = Ij^  and = G(0) = 1/2, 
which again implies that the outcome is random. That is, the probability 
of winning the prize and losing the prize is 0.5. At the Nash equilibrium, 
substituting 1% =  ^^ k equation (21), we get 
T^he slope of the reaction function can be derived as 
dli _ [g' f (Ig) f'dl) (Pl - PW>] 
dl2  ^ [g' f'dl) f'dl) (Pl - Pw) + B f''(Il) (Pl-Pw) • C"di)] 
The slope of the reaction function depends on the sign of g'. If g' > 0, 
then (dli/dio) < 0 and if g' < 0, then (dli/dl2) > 0. The existence of 
Nash depends on the slopes of reaction functions of firm 1 and firm 2 [for 
details see Cornes and Sandler, 1986]. 
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C'(Ik) - (Pw - Pl) 8(0) f(1%) ( 2 2 )  
Equation (22) implies that the level of effort depends on the spread 
between the two prizes. 
The regulator can induce optimal behavior by the firms by setting 
Pw - PL = Vg(0). (23) 
Substituting equation (23) into equation (22) yields 
C'(Ik) . A f'(Ik)- (24) 
which inturn implies that 
A = C'(Ik)/ f'(Ik). 
This is exactly the first-order condition for social optimality in equation 
(9) and the same result obtained from the Pigouvian taxation scheme. The 
absolute sizes of the prizes Py and Pj^  are determined by both the 
optimality conditions and the budget balancing requirements. For budget 
balancing, the total expected receipts should equal total expected costs;® 
i.e. , 
[fdl) + fdg)] A = (Py + Pl) (25) 
At the equilibrium, f(I]^ ) - f(l2) ~ f(Ik), since = I2 = 1^ , which 
reduces the equation (25) to 
Holmstrom (1982) and Rasmusen (1987) indicate that budget balancing 
with risk neutrality lead to non-compliance. Budget balancing with risk 
neutrality works in tournaments due to the nonlinearity introduced by the 
endogenous probability of winning the prize. 
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A f(Ik) - (Pw + PL)/2 (26) 
i.e., the expected value product from pollution abatement equals the 
expected prize in equilibrium. Using equations (22) and (26), we can solve 
for Pl and Py as, 
Pl = 0.5 A f(Ik) - (C'(Ik)/[2g(0)f'(!%)]) - 0.5A (fdj,) - [l/g(0)]I27) 
Pw - 0.5 A f(Ik) + (C'(Ik)/[2g(0)f'(!%)]) » 0.5A IfCI^ ) + [l/g(0)]X28) 
The regulator needs to know A, f(Ij^ ), C'(I^ ), f ' (1^ )^, and g(0) to determine 
Pl and P^ . 
The scheme described in this section is a reward structure, since both 
the winner and the loser of the tournament are rewarded with prizes 
depending on their observed efforts towards pollution control. The winner 
of the pollution control tournament will be rewarded with a higher-value 
prize whereas the loser will be rewarded with a lesser-value prize. As the 
spread between the prizes increases there is more incentive for the firms 
to compete for the higher-value prize. This is an ideal instrument to use 
when the property right for pollution belongs to the firms because this 
scheme redistributes the increased welfare due to pollution control from 
the society to the firms. One of the limitations associated with this 
fixed reward scheme, however, is that the size of prizes Py and are not 
functions of the effort level put forth by individual firms to control 
pollution. As a result, the firms have an incentive to collude, reducing 
their pollution control effort while still receiving the same prizes. The 
flexible scheme in the next subsection addresses this concern. 
3.3.2 A Flexible Penalty Scheme 
The flexible penalty scheme described in this section is introduced as 
a way to reduce the collusion problem associated with the fixed reward 
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scheme.9 This is considered as a flexible penalty scheme, since, the size 
of penalties are functions of the actual abatement. In the penalty scheme 
tournament, the loser of the game will be assigned a larger negative value 
and the winner of the game will be assigned a smaller negative value when 
the actual abatement is less than the optimal abatement for the entire 
region. 
Again consider two firms, 1 and 2. The winner of the game will be the 
one with the largest I. Let Py be the penalty for the winner and be 
the penalty for the loser.Unlike in the fixed scheme in the previous 
section, the sizes of the fines (P^  and P^ ) in the flexible scheme depend 
on the total pollution abatement effort put forth in the region. 
Specifically, let A = + A2, where A^  represents the actual abatement 
level of firm 1, A2 represent the actual abatement level of firm 2, and A 
represent the actual abatement for the region. As A moves away from A, Pj^  
will become more negative. When A = A, there will be no penalty on either 
firm. The environmental authority sets the sum of the penalties (Py and 
P^ ) equal to the social loss from suboptimal abatement. Formally, 
Pw + ?! = A [A - A] < 0 (29) 
The individual prizes Py and P^  ^are defined as a fraction of this loss, 
with 
 ^  ^ (30) 
Pl = r^  A [A - A] = (l-r%) A [A - A] (31) 
A Flexible Reward Scheme as a function of actual abatement and optimal 
abatement could also be used to minimize the collusion problem to yield 
comparable results as that of the Flexible Penalty Scheme. 
®^The actual abatement cannot exceed optimal abatement because the 
prizes will be set in such a way that, when the actual abatement exceeds the 
optimal, the return from the prize will be less than the cost of the effort. 
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where and rj^  are fractions such that r^  + r^  •= 1. 
In this scheme the penalty imposed on the firm depends on the 
deviation of actual abatement from optimal abatement for the entire region. 
When the firms collude with each other, resulting in less total abatement, 
the penalty on both firms will be high. As the total actual abatement 
approaches total optimal abatement, the sum of the penalties will approach 
zero. This reduces the incentive to collude when a tournament is 
administered among many firms. 
Let the firm follow the objective function given in (14). By 
substituting equations (30) and (31) into equation (14), the firm's 
expected profits can be written as 
nP + f fw A [fdi) - A] + (1-f) (l-f„) A [fdi) - A] - C(Ii) (32) 
which can be simplified as 
nP + fw + a-P) (1-fw)) A [fdi) - A] - Cdi). 
The corresponding first-order condition for expected profit maximization is 
given by 
(Pw-PL)(af/aii) + {/9 fw + (1-/9) d-fy)) Af'(Ii) - C'd^ ) = 0 (33) 
Compare the first-order condition from fixed reward scheme given by 
equation (18) with that of equation (33). The additional term 
{/3 fy + (1-/9) (1-fy) ) Af'(Ii) in the flexible penalty scheme in equation 
(33) is introduced due to the fact that the expected returns to the firms 
are now functions of the actual pollution abatement for the region. That 
is, the additional term increases the cost of non-optimal behavior by the 
joint action of firms. Similar to fixed reward scheme, equation (20) and 
symmetry of the Nash equilibrium (with = 0.5 and = I2 = I*) can be 
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used to collapse these first-order condition to 
C'(I*) = (P„-PL)g(0)f'(I*) + 0.5 Af'd*) (34) 
Solving for the difference between winner's prize and the loser's prize, 
one can obtain 
Pw - Pl = [G'(I*)/f'(I*)] - {A/[2g(0)]). (35) 
Optimal behavior on the part of the firms can be induced if the 
regulator sets 
- PL = 0.5 [A/g(0)]. (36) 
Substituting this equation into the firm's first-order condition (34) 
yields : 
C'(I*) = Af'(I*) (37) 
or 
A = C(I*)/ f(I*), (38) 
again the first-order conditions from the social optimization problem, with 
the marginal private cost from pollution abatement equal to marginal social 
benefit. It is worth noting, comparing equations (23) and (36), that the 
difference between the winner's prize and the loser's prize in the case of 
fixed reward is twice that of the flexible penalty scheme. The intuition 
behind smaller prize difference in the case of flexible penalty structure 
is that the firm gets hit twice when it fails to control pollution. That 
is, the firm not only increases the probability of getting caught by 
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abating less pollution but it also increases the size of the penalty. 
Therefore, the regulator can achieve the same level of pollution control 
with smaller difference between the winner's and the loser's prize in the 
case of flexible penalty scheme. 
As in the case of Fixed Reward Scheme, the level of the penalties, Py 
and Pj^ , are determined by both the optimality conditions and the budget 
balancing requirements. For budget balancing, the total expected receipts 
should equal total expected costs; i.e., 
(Py + PL) = A {[fdi) + fdg)] - A) (39) 
At the Nash equilibrium, = I2 = I*, which reduces the equation (39) to 
(P„ + PL) = A [2 f(I*) - A] (40) 
i.e., the expected value of the product equals the expected prize in 
equilibrium. Using equations (29) and (34), we can solve for Py and Pj^  as 
P„ - 0.5 A (A - A) + ([C'(Ii)-0.5 Af'(Ii)] / 2g(0)f ' (Ij^ ) ) (41) 
Pl = 0.5 A (A - A) - ( [ C ' ( I i ) - 0 . 5  Af'd^ )] / 2g( 0)f' ( I i ) )  (42) 
The regulator needs to know A, fCI^ ), C'(I^ ), f'(I^ ), g(0) and A to 
determine P^  and Py as well as to impose the budget balancing requirements. 
Although, this scheme has the advantage of minimizing collusion, since the 
prizes Py and P^  are not predetermined as that of the Fixed Reward Scheme, 
the regulator has the opportunity to decrease the value of the prizes, once 
the firms have put forth adequate abatement control efforts. As a result, 
the flexible penalty scheme may induce moral hazard on the regulator side. 
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4. PIGOUVIAN TAX AND ROT: A COMPARISON FOR INFORMATION 
We have shown that both ROT and a Pigouvian tax result in the same 
efficiency conditions. If it can be shown that ROT is more cost effective 
than the Pigouvian tax due to differences in the information requirement, 
then ROT will be preferred to the Pigouvian tax. First, we consider the 
differences in the information requirements of Pigouvian taxes and ROTs. 
Second, we discuss the ramifications of the error structure due to common 
weather factors. 
4.1 Information Requirements 
tf we compare ROT with the Pigouvian tax, it can be seen from 
equations (10) and (11) that the Pigouvian taxation requires information on 
either (1) (i = 1, 2), which implies that we have information on both 
firm level and total ambient concentration (SAj^  = A), or (2) I^ , f(I^ ), and 
6^  in order to assess A^  exactly. In addition, information on marginal 
damage costs (A) is needed to set the tax rate. The maximization problem 
can be solved for optimal Ij^ , which implies that the optimal abatement can 
be arrived at. Even if we have information on Ij^  and f(Ij^ ), Aj^  cannot be 
determined without error, because is random. 
The information requirement for ROT depends on the assumptions 
regarding pollution abatement effort. When the rank of A^  equals the rank 
of I, ROT requires less cost to implement than the Pigouvian tax, because 
ranking, in general, requires less information than assessing the absolute 
levels of pollution emissions. For example, consider the case of soil 
erosion. It is prohibitively expensive to measure soil erosion from each 
field. However, Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) can be used to index 
the erosion control efforts of individual farms and to rank the farms for 
the ROT. The components of USLE, such as crop factor and support practice 
factor can be thought as the effort put forth to control soil erosion. 
Therefore, instead of measuring the soil erosion at each farm, USLE can be 
used as a proxy for soil erosion and the farm's erosion abatement effort. 
However, the USLE does not provide a perfect measure of erosion conditions 
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on the land, so that the ranking of the actual abatement and the farmer's 
investment into soil erosion control may not match; i.e., there is error in 
the linkages between and I^ , the of equation (4). The next section 
discusses this error structure.^  
4.2 Error Structure 
The two type of errors considered here are the common error and the 
specific error. The common error is defined as the error that is common to 
all the firms that are participating in the tournament, whereas specific 
error is defined as the error that pertains just to i*-^  firm. That is, the 
error term, in equation (4) can be decomposed into 
-  p + T£ (43) 
where p is the common error that pertains to all firms in the tournament 
and represents the firm specific error. In the case of soil erosion, 
common error can be exemplified by heavy rainfall in the region of all 
tournament participating farms, whereas, the firm specific error would 
include the care and education of each farmer. That is, the effect of 
heavy rainfall in the region would have the same impact on soil erosion in 
all the participating farms, whereas, the farm specific care and education 
of the farmer would have a different impact on each participating farm. 
For simplicity, we assume that corr(p, r^ ) = corrfr^ , rj) = 0 and E(p) = 
E(rj^ ) = 0. Using equation (43), equation (4) can then be rewritten as 
•= f (I j^)  + p + (44) 
The relative sizes of p and play key roles in the efficacy of ROTs. 
^^ A potential problem due to incomplete indexing is that the firms will 
be geared toward concentrating on those variables that go into the index, 
ignoring other factors that help in pollution abatement. Again, in the case 
of soil erosion, if the indexing comprises of crop characteristics and 
cultivation practices, other factors, such as the spacing between the rows 
which also has an important effect on soil erosion, will be ignored. 
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For example, consider a situation where = 0 for all i. In this case, 
there exists an error p common to all firms, but no firm specific error. 
In the case of our soil erosion example, this situation would be 
approximated if rainfall played a dominant role in the erosion of a small 
region. The USLE measure of erosion, which is a function of rainfall in a 
particular region, would be dominated by variation in rainfall. Similarly, 
measurement error could play a dominant role in the linkage between and 
Ij^ . The USLE index could be biased toward upward or downward due to the 
use of common measuring instrument in developing the USLE. Under such a 
situation equation (44) can be modified as 
Ai - f(Ii) + p. (45) 
A ROT, conducted based on the ranking of Ij^ , would exactly match the 
ranking based on Aj^ , because the common error does not impact the ranking 
of firm abatement. That is, a regulator who cannot observe p can do as 
well as the one who observes the common error term by adopting the 
tournament scheme. 
In contrast, when a Pigouvian tax is administered with a common 
measurement error, it will lead to a non-optimal level of effort in 
pollution abatement. This is because the application of the Pigouvian tax 
depends on the absolute level of effort in pollution abatement. To assess 
the correct Pigouvian tax in the presence of common error, the regulator 
requires the information on p. Cabe and Herriges (1992, p.140) indicate 
that " the burden of information required to implement a tax is 
significant." Especially in non-point source pollution, the regulator 
should assess the damage caused by each polluter, their cost structure, and 
emissions requiring monitoring of individual firms. In addition, under the 
scheme described by Cabe and Herriges, the regulator should assess the 
producer's expectations on the prior distribution of transport mechanisms. 
The uncertainty in the pollution fate and transport due to common 
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error factors, such as weather conditions and measurement error in 
pollution emission, makes it more difficult to implement the Pigouvian tax. 
The resulting effort in pollution abatement under common uncertain weather 
conditions and common measurement error will be inefficient when the 
Pigouvian tax or subsidy is imposed. In contrast, environmental ROT yields 
efficient effort in pollution abatement in the presence of common weather 
conditions and common measurement error. 
ROTs, in general, requires less information than the Pigouvian tax for 
implementation. The ROTs do not require information on common sources of 
error, such as investment measurement error or common weather factors 
because of its use of a relative payment scheme. 
However, the reduced expense of administering a ROT must be traded off 
against the potential for error in ranking the abatement effort of the 
firm. If the firm's true abatement effort level is poorly represented by 
the index of their abatement effort, then the ROT scheme will lead to an 
inefficient level of effort on the part of the individual firms. The next 
section describes several cases in which ROT's may fail. 
Malcomson (1986) indicates that only the principal need to observe the 
performance of the worker which means that the rewards can be made a function 
of performance. The ROTs can be cheaper to administer since, the cost of 
collecting such performance information is likely to be low (Malcomson, 
1986). 
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5. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ROT MAY FAIL 
There are several conditions under which ROTs may fail. We consider 
two key conditions: (1) mistakes due to error term, and (2) heterogeneity 
of the firms. 
5.1 Mistakes due to the Error Term 
The curvature of f(I^ ) and uncertainty due to play a primary role 
in potentially misranking the firms. When the variance of is high, and 
the firm specific error term is large, there is as increased probability 
that the ranking of will not match the ranking of The impact of 
is also increased as the curvature of f(I^ ) is flatter. This section 
explores the impact of the error structure and f'(I^ ) on the possibility of 
misranking under a ROT scheme. 
Consider two firms, firm 1 and 2, with < I2; i.e., firm 1 actually 
puts forth less abatement effort than firm 2. The probability, 6, that the 
two firms are incorrectly ranked on the basis of their abatement effort is 
given by 
9 = Prob (A^  > A2 I A) 
= Prob { f(Ii) - f(l2) > (£2 - (1) I A ) (46) 
= Prob { f(Ii) - f(l2) > w 1 A } (47) 
where 
A s - I2, (48) 
denotes the actual gap in abatement effort and w = 62 ' , where 
Collusion and sabotage may also lead to tournament failures. We do 
not discuss in detail the problems due to collusion. However, the 
incentives for collusion can be greatly reduced by adopting the flexible 
penalty scheme. 
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« - N(0,2a^ ), given that are normally and independently distributed. 
Equation (47) can be written as 
e  =  G [ f ( i i )  -  f d g ) ]  (49) 
where G(.) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of w. 
A first-order Taylor series expansion of f(l2) around yields 
f(Il) - f(l2) « A f'(Ii) (50) 
Substituting equation (50) into equation (49) yields: 
B  «  G [ A  f ( I ^ ) ] .  (51) 
Consider the cdf in equation (51). We know that G(-oo) = 0 and G(m) = 1. 
Since A is negative, and f' (Ij^ ) is positive, then A f ' (Ij^ ) is negative. As 
a result, 
The probability of making a mistake, i.e., the probability that abatement 
of firm 1 will be greater than the abatement of firm 2, given that the 
investment of firm 1 is smaller than the investment of firm 2, is less than 
0.5. Two conclusions can be drawn from equation (52). First, as the 
deviation between the two firm's investment increases (i.e., A increases), 
the probability of making a mistake in ranking the firms decreases (since 
A f'(Ij^ ) becomes more negative). Second, as the slope of the 
transformation function [i.e., f'(Ij^ )] increases, the probability of making 
a mistake in ranking the firms decreases since again A f'(l2) becomes more 
negative. Note that when = p, u> = p - p = 0 (i.e., w has a degenerate 
distribution with G(0) = 1 and G(x) = 0 V x 1). 
e = G[A f(I^ )] <0.5 (52) 
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These basic conclusions are illustrated graphically in Figures 1 
and 2. Consider the effect of error terra. If there is a common error term 
across firms (with no firm specific error), the ROT will accurately 
preserve the ranking of by using the I^ 's. For example, with a common 
error term of = ^ 2 ™  ^ in Figure 1, 
= f(Ii) + €. (53) 
= A+i. 
The ranking of abatement effort is consistent with the ranking of the 
actual, abatement levels in the presence of a common error. Firm 2 is 
observed to invest more resources in abatement effort (I2 > I^ ) and their 
actual abatement level is higher (A'^ 2 > A"*'j^ ) . In contrast, when both 
common and specific errors arise, the probability of incorrectly ranking 
the firms become non-zero. For example suppose = e while «2 " -(- The 
actual abatement levels of the two firms then become 
Ai = f(Ii) + 
= A + _ 
A2 - f(l2) - «. 
(54) 
(55) 
These points are illustrated in Figure 1. While the ROT administrator 
would observe greater effort on the part of firm 2 (I^  < I2), their true 
abatement level for firm 1 would be higher (A"*^ ]^  "^2). In the presence of 
both common error (such as weather) and specific error (such as ability and 
care) the ranking based on abatement effort may not match with the ranking 
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Figure 1. Mistakes due to the size of the error term 
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based on abatement.As noted above, 
of the transformation function [f'(I)] 
error in the ROT. Consider the effort 
I2 and I2 in Figure 2 with the flatter 
Again, for simplicity assume that " 
firms are given by 
Ai = ff(Ii) + e 
Ag = ff(l2) - E 
using equation (52), the steepness 
also influences the potential for 
levels for the two firms 1 and 2 at 
transformation function f^ (Ij^ ) . 
-62' The abatements for the two 
(56) 
(57) 
as shown in Figure 2. The ranking based on abatements with flatter 
transformation curve (i.e., A^ )^ will not match the ranking based on 
abatement effort of the firms (i.e., I^ ). In contrast, consider the case 
of steeper transformation curve with the same assumptions on abatement 
efforts and errors. The abatements for the two firms are now given by 
Ai = fS(Ii) + e (58) 
-
Ag = f*(l2) - e (59) 
s A®2 
l^ Of course it is possible that the correct ranking wy.1 be observed, 
if, for example, e-i = -e and €0 - e, then A,- = A"i and Ao =• A 9, with It < lo 
and Ai < Ag. i  ^
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as shown in Figure 2. With steeper transformation curves, the ranking of 
the abatements (i.e., A®^ ) matches the ranking of the abatement efforts 
(i.e., I^ ). This is the conclusion drawn above from equation (52). Under 
the case where flatter transformation curve leads to misranking, the 
regulator can expend resources to collect more information about so 
that the ranking of a combination of and will equal the ranking of 
A^ 's. The collection of more information on helps in proper ranking by 
reducing the variance of e^ . The level of expenditure on information 
collection will depend on the spread of e^ , the slope of f(I^ ), and the 
cost and the value of information. 
5.2 Heterogenous Firms 
Assume there are two firms with differences in their marginal cost of 
investment, and each firm knows its ability to invest in pollution control. 
Also assume that the regulator does not have information on the ability of 
the firms. If a ROT is held among contestants of unequal abilities, Lazear 
and Rosen (1981) show that these two firms (one with high ability to invest 
and the other with low ability to invest) will not sort into their own 
ability groups for competition. This is due to the reason that a firm with 
low ability can receive a higher reward when it plays with a high ability 
firm. As a result, when a high-ability firm and a low-ability firm compete 
with each other in the same group (i.e., mixed contestants), it leads to 
inefficient level of investment by the firms. 
In particular, consider two firms, 1 and 2, with marginal cost of 
efforts C'j^ (I) < C'2(I). where [/^ (I) is the marginal cost of firm 1 and 
C'2(I) is the marginal cost of firm 2. As in the case examined by Lazear 
and Rosen (1981), assume only that the firms know their ability to control 
pollution, and not the regulator. If a ROT is held among firms of unequal 
abilities, the firms will not self-sort into their own ability level groups 
for competition due to the reason that there does not exist a pure 
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Figure 2. Mistakes due to the steepness of the transformation function 
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price-rationing mechanism to induce Pareto optimal self-selection. The 
intuition behind the mixed play is that the rewards increase with the 
ability of the firms. Lazear and Rosen show that the players either 
overinvest or under-invest depending on the proportion of firms in each of 
the cost groups. The differences in the investments causes inefficiency in 
a mixed contestants play. 
When the identity of each firm is known to everyone including the 
regulator, by introducing a competitive handicap system discussed in Lazear 
and Rosen (1981) mixed contestants can be made efficient. Consider two 
types of players u and v, with u's being the high investment players and 
v's being low investment players. In the labor literature, Lazear and 
Rosen prove that ROTs between similar players (i.e., a u-type firm playing 
against another u-type firm and a v-type firm playing against another v-
type firm) will yield efficient results, whereas ROTs which involve 
distinct players (i.e., a u-type firm competing against a v-type firm) will 
lead to non-optimal effort elicitation from the workers. The intuition 
behind the non-optimal effort investment is that the high effort players 
are investing more than the low effort players to receive the same prize. 
In the case of environmental arena, consider the example of soil erosion 
with heterogeneity in the slope of the land. A producer who invests more 
to control soil erosion on a hilly terrain would still have a smaller 
probability of winning when compared to another producer who exerts the 
same effort on a levelled land because the erodability of a land increases 
with slope. This reduces the incentive to control soil erosion on the part 
of high investment producer. 
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6. IMPLICATIONS TO NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
Since significant progress has been made in the control of point 
source pollution, non-point source pollution now commands greater attention 
by regulators (Anderson et ai., 1985; Graham-Tomsai and Wiese, 1990; Young 
et al., 1989; Cabe and Herriges, 1992; and Segerson, 1988). In non-point 
source pollution, the actions of several polluters collectively contribute 
to the ambient concentration and the contribution of individuals to 
pollution emission is prohibitively expensive to monitor. In this section, 
we consider two examples of non-point source pollution created by 
agriculture: 1) soil erosion/sedimentation and 2) groundwater 
contamination. The soil erosion/sedimentation example provides an 
environment wherein the ROTs may be effectively applied due to the presence 
of (a) observable qualities such as the rainfall factor, soil erodability 
factors, slope and length of the land, support practices, and variety of 
crops grown and (b) existing mechanisms for combining the impact of these 
factors on soil erosion to form an effort index. The groundwater 
contamination, on the other hand serves as an example wherein ROTs will be 
more difficult to apply, due in large part to the absence of good proxies 
for abatement. However, advances in technology such as the development of 
Geographic Information System, may provide such proxies in the future. 
6.1 Soil Erosion/Sedimentation 
Soil erosion is an important non-point source pollution problem 
associated with farming. Based on the 1977 National Resource Inventory 
(USDA, 1981), 23% of the crop land is suffering from sheet and rill erosion 
in excess of the T values recommended by the Conservation Provisions of the 
1985 Food Security Act.^  ^ This positive net erosion in the soil will not 
only reduce the productivity of the soil resource but also will lead to 
sedimentation in irrigation canals and reservoirs. 
The soil loss tolerance level (T) is the maximum rate of annual soil 
erosion that may occur and still permit a high level of crop productivity to 
be obtained economically and indefinitely (Sinner, 1990). 
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ROTs may prove successful in efforts to control soil erosion. The 
application of ROTs would involve ranking of each of the farms based on the 
level of soil erosion or on an index representing the level of effort put 
into soil erosion control. Since it is difficult to measure the level of 
soil erosion in crop lands, the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) is 
often used for estimation purposes. The USLE has five major components; 
the rainfall factor (R), the soil erodability factor (K), the slope and 
length factor (LS), support practice factor (P) and the crop factor (C). 
The USLE can be written as 
A = R*K*LS*P*C (60) 
where A is the soil loss in tons/acre/year (t/a/y). The principal reason 
behind the wide usage of USLE is due to the fact that the components of 
USLE are readily observable. However, the USLE provides only an 
approximate (average) soil erosion estimate. There will likely be 
difference between the actual level of soil erosion and the USLE estimate. 
Both common factors {p), such as heavy rainfall and wind and the farm 
specific factors (r^ ), such as farmer care and education, will likely yield 
differences between the USLE index of erosion and its actual level. Thus, 
a Pigouvian tax based on USLE to control soil erosion will lead to 
inefficient level of erosion abatement efforts. 
Now consider the use of USLE as an index to rank the farms based on 
the tournaments. In the presence of a common measurement error in 
estimating the soil erosion as well as common erratic weather, the farms 
can be ranked using ROTs based on their estimated levels of soil erosion. 
The observable qualities that influence the soil erosion such as the 
rainfall factor, soil erodability factor, slope and length of the land, 
support practices, and variety of crops grown are used to construct the 
index, USLE. The common measurement errors and the weather influences do 
not matter, since they get eliminated by ranking the farms based on the 
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estimated level of soil erosion. In the case of non-point source 
pollution, it is rather difficult or prohibitively expensive to monitor the 
individual firm's contribution towards ambient concentration of pollution. 
Therefore, in the presence of observable proxies of pollution abatement for 
individual firms, ROTs may be a cost effective alternative to Pigouvian 
taxes. 
Consider the practical implementation of ROTs for soil erosion 
control. The regulator has to examine the components of USLE and construct 
an index based on observed qualities. The question arises as to how 
difficult it is to observe the qualities and are there any current erosion 
control programs that make use of the observable qualities of soil erosion. 
In fact, the existing Conservation Compliance Program makes use of the 
observable components of USLE to determine the eligibility of the farmers 
for government programs as a means to control soil erosion. The 
Conservation Compliance Program requires that any land owner farming a 
highly erodable land should develop and apply a suitable conservation plan 
for that land (Dinehart and Libby, 1980; Grumbach, 1983; Erwin et al., 
1984; McSweeny, 1984; Batie and Sappington, 1986; Sinner, 1990; Govindasamy 
and Duffy, 1993; and Govindasamy and Huffman, 1993). If this condition is 
not met, the land owner will not be eligible for most federal farm program 
benefits. According to the program the producers are restricted not to 
erode more than 7 t/a/y of soil. 
Having discussed the advantages of ROTs to control soil erosion, now 
consider the potential limitation of ROTs as described in section 5. 
First, consider the error structure. The impact of the error term depends 
on the relative size of the common and firm specific error component. When 
the farms that are involved in the tournament are close to each other, the 
variation in weather across the farms and the common error term will be 
relatively small. This suggest conducting tournaments within smaller 
regional divisions. However, the firm specific error term may still be 
large enough to result in erroneous ranking of the firms based on the USLE. 
122 
These errors can be reduced by refining the USLE to specific region and/or 
using more complex models of sedimentation flows to index soil erosion 
control efforts. 
Second consider the heterogenous nature of the farms. In the case of 
soil erosion heterogeneity could arise from factors such as the farm size, 
soil types and the slope of the land. That is two farms adopting the same 
techniques to control soil erosion could result in two different levels of 
soil erosion. As discussed in section 5.2, one can use the handicap system 
discussed in Lazear and Rosen to achieve efficiency. The USLE would 
provide an obvious basis for such a handicapping system, and one with some 
degree of acceptance in the farming community. 
6.2 Groundwater Contamination 
The most damaging and the widespread environmental effect of 
agricultural production is the non-point source pollution created by 
activities such as excessive fertilizer and pesticide application and 
improper animal waste management (National Research Council, 1989). 
Agriculture accounts for about half of all water pollution and the surface 
water damage from agriculture is estimated at between $2 billion and $16 
billion per year (Kintzer, 1990). Under the sections of 304(f) and 305(b) 
of the Clean Water Act of 1972, 17 states identified agriculture as a 
primary source of water pollution and 27 states identified it as a problem 
in U.S. (Environmental Protection Agency, 1989). Well waters of 44 
different states in U.S. has been found contaminated with agricultural 
chemicals (Nielsen and Lee, 1987). 
The information requirements associated with many non-point source 
pollution control mechanisms represent a significant barrier to their 
practical implementation. It is typically not enough to measure the 
ambient concentration of a pollutant at a receptor site. It is also 
See, for example, the CEEPES model developed in Johnson et al. (1990), 
the AGNPS model developed in Young et al. (1989) and the SEDEC model 
developed in Bouzaher et al. (1990). 
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difficult to monitor the individual producer's contribution to groundwater 
contamination with pesticides and fertilizers due to high costs. Cabe and 
Herriges (1992) note that the administration of the Pigouvian tax requires 
information on pollution emission by individual firms. In contrast, the 
administration of ROT's require an ordinal proxy for the individual firm's 
contribution of pollution, such as chemicals bought by the producer. We 
explore how one could construct a structure to implement ROT in controlling 
groundwater pollution caused by agriculture. 
Assume that there are 'n' farms irrigated by a reservoir. The 
reservoir is normally built in an elevated area and the water is drawn 
using gravitational force. The farms located downstream are irrigated 
through the channels from the reservoir. This is a picture of most 
artificially irrigated farms. The transport of pesticides and fertilizers 
through irrigated water to the downstream farms is one of the common 
problems associated with irrigated agriculture. The groundwater 
contamination downstream would depict the level of pollution caused by the 
entire set of farms in the cultivated area. It is impossible to attribute 
the cause of groundwater contamination to each and every farm. 
Under such conditions, application of the ROT-penalty scheme may work 
efficiently if either 1) the level of pollution concentration contributed 
by individual firms is observable or 2) there exists observable proxies of 
pollution abatement effort put forth by individual firms that accurately 
preserves the relative success of individual firms in abating pollution. 
The regulator can monitor the groundwater contamination downstream for the 
entire cultivated area, and then penalize one or more farms if the ambient 
concentration for the entire command area exceeds the optimal level, or 
reward the farms if the ambient concentration falls below the optimal 
level. But the selection of farms for penalization or reward depends on 
the ranking of an individual farm for pollution abatement. This is a rank 
order tournament, since the penalization depends on the ranking of the 
farms, and not on the level of pollution emissions. 
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Now comes the question, what information is available on individual 
farms which can be used as a proxy to assess groundwater contamination 
caused by individual farms? The groundwater contamination is not readily 
observable by the regulator unless some testing is done on the water in 
question. A potential proxy could be the amount of fertilizers and 
pesticides purchased from the dealer. This information can be collected 
from one or more dealers of agricultural chemicals without monitoring 
individual farms. But there are numerous potential problems associated 
with this approach. First, the leaching not only depends on the quantity 
of fertilizer and pesticides applied but also on other factors such as 
weather conditions, soil quality, proximity to the aquifers, the tillage 
practices adopted and the crops grown. Models of this fate and transport 
problems are rare (e.g., CEEPES developed by Johnson et al., 1990). 
Second, the quantity of fertilizer and pesticides applied could be 
different from the quantity bought. In essence, the quantity of fertilizer 
and pesticides purchased from the dealers could be a bad proxy for 
pollution emission by individual farm. 
How relevant are the potential limits of a tournament to control non-
point source pollution in agriculture?. First, the impact of mistakes due 
to the error term depends on the slope of the transformation function f(I) 
and the size of the error term e^ . If the tournament covers a narrow area, 
the environmental effects may not be common to all the farms in the 
region. Consider the special case of soil characteristics and weather. 
Assuming that the quantity of fertilizer purchased from the dealer as a 
proxy for the rate of application, the ranking based on the proxy may not 
match with the ranking based on the groundwater contamination due to the 
fact that quantity of fertilizer purchased may not be a good proxy to 
measure groundwater contamination by individual farms. Second, the major 
limitation associated with the application of ROT to groundwater pollution 
control is the presence of heterogeneity among the contestants. In the 
example of groundwater contamination each producer can differ from others 
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in characteristics such as weather, soil conditions, the presence of 
aquifers, slope of the land, and water availability. The problem with 
these varied characteristics is that if we group the farms based on soil 
characteristics, they may not be homogeneous in terms of water availability 
and other qualities. 
To some extend, the problems due to heterogeneity of the farms can be 
handled by the handicap system as in the case of soil erosion problem. The 
main difference between the groundwater contamination problem and the soil 
erosion problem is the presence or absence of observable good proxies to 
rank the farms for contamination. The groundwater contamination due to 
non-point source pollution has gained importance only in the recent past 
compared to the problem of soil erosion. With existing technology, cost 
savings from ROT may be small (since the information costs would remain 
high) and the probability of incorrect ranking (ff) adds inefficiency. 
There is a trade-off between cost of collecting the information for 
the index and its usefulness for ranking the farms. The index can range 
from no information to full information. When the index contains full 
pollution information on individual farms, we can as well use Pigouvian 
taxation to achieve an optimal effort to control pollution. To administer 
the Pigouvian tax, we need information on the contribution of individual 
farms toward pollution. We also need to monitor individual farms to assess 
the marginal damage and the total pollution emissions. In contrast, when 
the index contains no information (i.e., when there does not exist an 
observable proxy), the ranking of the farm becomes random, a scenario 
considered by Xepapadeas (1991). In the random penalization method 
proposed by Xepapadeas, one of the firms gets randomly penalized in the 
event that the actual ambient concentration exceeds the optimal level for 
the entire region. Under random penalization, the farms contributing less 
towards soil erosion might get penalized while the farms contributing a lot 
towards pollution may not. 
The ROT provides a middle ground between the Pigouvian tax and the 
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random penalty scheme. First, one can overcome .e problems associated 
with the random penalty mechanism, such as penalizing farms that contribute 
less toward soil erosion by adopting ROT, because the ranking would 
penalize the most polluting farm. Second, the problems associated with 
perfect monitoring, as in taxation, can be minimized by using limited 
information and proxies to rank the farms in the case of ROT. Third, ROT 
does not require information on the common disturbances, such as weather 
effects on the soil erosion, by ranking of the farms. That is, by ranking 
two farms with a common weather factor, a regulator who cannot observe the 
common shock can do as well as one who observes the common shock. 
Therefore, if the Pigouvian tax can be administered, ROT can be designed to 
attain the same allocation of resources in the case of risk neutral farms 
using limited information and proxy variables. The use of limited 
information in ROT leads to cost savings in acquiring information. 
In spite of the limitations, ROTs may well be attractive to resolve 
some environmental problems. In the case of soil erosion non-point source 
pollution, ROTs do require less information than the Pigouvian tax, due to 
the use of proxies and the existence of common factors -- weather and 
measurement errors. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The traditional pollution control instruments have had limited success 
due to their information requirement in monitoring individual farms. This 
paper makes five principal contributions. First, this paper introduces the 
idea of environmental ROTs using the insights from the labor literature, 
which provides a potential solution to the monitoring problem. Second, the 
paper shows that in the case of risk neutral firms, conditions exist where 
the Pigouvian tax and the environmental ROT yield an identical efficient 
allocation of resources. Both a fixed reward scheme and a flexible penalty 
scheme are analyzed for their efficiency and practicality. The fixed 
reward scheme is budget balancing in the sense that it redistributes the 
increased welfare created by pollution abatement back to the firms, 
whereas, the flexible penalty scheme is not budget balancing. An advantage 
to flexible penalty scheme is that the incentives for collusion among the 
firms are reduced due to the dependence of the size of the penalties on the 
level of pollution abatement. But, it should be noted that the flexible 
penalty scheme is not budget balancing and may be subject to moral hazard 
problem on the part of the regulator. Third, the paper analyzes the two 
key conditions under which ROTs may lead to suboptimal allocation of 
resources: (1) mistakes due to the error term, (2) heterogeneous firms. 
The results show that the probability of misranking with ROTs decreases as 
the deviation between the firm's investment increases and as the slope of 
the transformation function becomes steeper. Fourth, in the case of soil 
erosion, the paper demonstrates that ROTs provide a compromise between the 
complete monitoring and the random penalization methods. Fifth, using the 
example of groundwater contamination, the paper demonstrates that in the 
absence of observable good proxies, ROTs do not have any advantages over 
the Pigouvian tax scheme. Although ROTs are not universally applicable, 
they should be considered seriously as an alternative tool to control 
environmental pollution problems. 
128 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, G., J. Opaluch, and W. Sullivan, 1985. Non-point agricultural 
pollution: Pesticide contamination of groundwater supplies, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67: 1238-1243. 
Bâtie, Sandra S., and Alyson Sappington, 1986. Cross-Compliance As a Soil 
Conservation Strategy: A Case Study. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 68: 880-885. 
Bouzaher, Aziz, John Braden and Gary Johnson, 1990. A Dynamic Programming 
Approach to a Class of Non-point Source Pollution Control Problems. 
Management Science, 36: 1-15. 
Bull, Clive, Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt, 1987. Tournaments and 
Piece Rates:An Experimental Study, Journal of Political Economy, 95; 
1-33. 
Cabe, Richard and Joseph A. Herriges, 1992. The Regulation of Non-Point 
Source Pollution Under Imperfect and Asymmetric Information, Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management, 22: 134-146. 
Carmichael, Lome H., 1983. The Agent-Agents Problem: Payment by Relative 
Output, Journal of Labor Economics, 1: 50-65. 
Cornes, Richard and Todd Sandler, 1986. The Theory of Externalities, 
Public Goods, and Club Goods. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Dinehart, Stephen J., and Lawrence W. Libby, 1985. The Effects of Cross 
Compliance: A Study on Nine Wheat and Corn Belt States. Farm Level 
Impacts of Adopting Cross-Compliance Programs: Policy Implications, 
ed., Sandra Batie and David Erwin, pp 26-43. Dep. Agr. Econ. Rep., 
University of Missouri. 
Drago, Robert and John S. Heywood, 1989. Tournaments, Piece Rates, and the 
Shape of the Payoff Function, Journal of Political Economy, 97: 992-
998. 
Drago, Robert and Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 1988. The Incentive Effects of 
Tournaments with Positive Externalities among Workers, Southern 
Economic Journal, 55: 100-106. 
Dye, Ronald A., 1984. The Trouble With Tournaments, Economic Inquiry, 22: 
147-149. 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., and Michael L. Bognanno, 1990. Do Tournaments Have 
Incentive Effects?, Journal of Political Economy, 98: 1307-1324. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1989. Non-point Sources Agenda for the 
Future, January, pp 2. 
Erwin, David E., William D. Heffernan, and Gary P. Green, 1984. Cross 
Compliance for Erosion Control: Anticipating Efficiency and 
Distributive Impacts. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
:273-78. 
Govindasamy, Ramu, and Mike Duffy, 1993. Alternative Methods For Soil 
Conservation to Comply with the Conservation Compliance Program, 
Journal of the American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers, 
(Forthcoming). 
129 
Govindasamy, Rarau, and Wallace Huffman, 1993. Efficiency of U.S. 
Conservation Compliance Program, Agricultural Economics, 8: 173-185. 
Graham-Tomsai, T., and A. Wiese, 1990. Land Use and Incentive Schemes for 
Non-point Pollution Control in a Spatial Equilibrium Setting, Staff 
paper. Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of 
Minnesota. 
Grumbach, Alyson R., 1983. Cross Compliance as a Soil Conservation 
Strategy: A Case Study of the North Fork of the Forked Deer River 
Basin in Western Tennessee. M.S. thesis, Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University. 
Green, Jerry R., and Nancy L. Stokey, 1983. A Comparison of Tournaments 
and Contracts, Journal of Political Economy, 91: 349-364. 
Holmstrom, Bengt, 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics, 
13; 324-340. 
Johnson, S.R., P.E. Rosenberry, J.F. Shogren, and P.J. Kuch, 1990. CEEPES: 
An Overview of the Comprehensive Economic Environmental Policy 
Evaluation System. CARD Staff Report 90-SR 47. Ames: Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University. 
Kintzer, Barry, 1990. How Poultry Waste Management Can Prevent 
Contamination of Ground and Surface Water, Proceedings of 1990 
National Poultry Waste Management Symposium, edited by Blake and 
Hulet, Department of Poultry Science, Auburn University. 
Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen, 1981. Rank-Order Tournaments as 
Optimum Labor Contracts, Journal of Political Economy, 89: 841-864. 
Malcomson, James. M., 1986. Rank Order Contracts for a Principal with Many 
Agents, Review of Economic Studies, 53: 807-817. 
McSweeny, William T., 1984. A Risk Programming Analysis of Farm Level Soil 
and Nutrient Loss Control Decisions Under a Program of Cross-
Compliance, Ph.D. diss. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University. 
Nalebuff, Barry J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983a. Prizes and Incentives: 
Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, The Bell 
Journal of Economics, 14: 21-43. 
Nalebuff, Barry J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983b. Information, 
Competition, and Markets, American Economic Review, 73: 278-283. 
National Research Council, 1989. Alternative Agriculture, National Academy 
Press, Washington, D.C., 1989, pp 98. 
Nielsen and Lee, 1987. The Magnitude and Costs of Groundwater Contamination 
from Agricultural Chemicals: A National Perspective. Agric. Econ. 
Report No. 576, Economic Research Service, USDA. 
O'Keeffe, Mary., W.Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1984. Economic 
Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes, Journal of Labor Economics, 2: 
27-56. 
Rasmusen, Eric, 1987. Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams, RAND Journal of 
Economics, 18: 428-435. 
130 
Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments, 
American Economic Review, 76: 701-715, 
Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. Uncertainty and Incentives for Non-Point Source 
Pollution Control, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
15: 87-98. 
Sinner, Jim, 1990. Soil Conservation: We Can Get More for Our Tax Dollars. 
Choices, pp. 10-13. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1981. Soil and Water Resources 
Conservation Act - 1980 Appraisal, Part I, Washington DC, March. 
Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. Environmental policy under imperfect information: 
Incentives and moral hazard. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 20: 113-126. 
Young, R.A., C.A. Onstad, D.D. Bosch, and W.P. Anderson, 1989. AGNPS: A 
non-point source pollution model for evaluating agricultural 
watershed, Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, 44: 168-173. 
131 
GENERAL SUMMARY 
In this study, the environmental pollution control under alternative 
incentive structures was investigated with an emphasis on the effectiveness 
and practicality of the tools. The focus of attention has been on three 
alternative instruments: 1) Environmental Bonds, 2) Budget Balancing 
Incentive Mechanisms, and 3) Environmental Rank Order Tournaments to 
control pollution. These instruments vary in their information requirement 
for implementation. Instruments such as environmental bonds require more 
information for implementation when compared to budget balancing incentive 
mechanisms and rank order tournaments. But the cost associated with using 
less information and committing an error verses acquiring more information 
at additional costs were discussed. 
The study first examined the limits to environmental bonds. It 
identified three major limitations to environmental bonds: 1) government 
moral hazard, 2) liquidity constraints, and 3) legal restrictions. It 
analyzed the severity of each of these limitations with possible solutions 
and alternatives that may come into existence in the event that the 
environmental bonds are implemented. Liquidity constraints are the major 
factors that reduce the attractiveness of using environmental bonds in the 
agricultural sector. Neither private bankers nor insurers will step up 
quickly to offer financial backing necessary to unbind the constraint. 
This result is similar to the labor problem where workers rarely have the 
private assets to post a performance bond. Another major limitation 
associated with environmental bond is that it requires monitoring of 
individual firms. The paper also discussed other limitations such as 
source identity, time horizon for bonds and valuation of damages. Using a 
real world example the paper analyzed how the bonds are used to control 
environmental pollution in case of surface mining of coal and identified 
the conditions under which bonds may be successfully implemented. The 
paper also considered other incentive schemes offered by the labor 
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literature such as efficiency wages, increasing wage profiles, trust funds, 
and rank order tournaments. 
As a solution to this monitoring limitation, Xepapadeas (1991) 
introduced a random penalization incentive scheme. Paper II demonstrated 
that risk aversion is a necessary condition to attain compliance in case of 
budget balancing with fine which contradicts Xepapadeas arguments. Using 
Rasmusen (1987) the paper proved that the compliance can be achieved if the 
firms are sufficiently risk averse. The paper also showed that 1) the 
Rasmusen's compliance set for the social objectives can be expanded by 
shifting the probability of detection and fines from high risk averse firm 
to low risk averse firm and 2) an increase in the number of firms has a 
negative effect on compliance. These results have important policy 
implications. Specifically, more firms can be made to comply with the 
social objectives by shifting the probability of detection and the fines 
toward less risk averse firms. Compliance can also be improved by 
subdividing a group of firms into several small partitions. In general 
even though budget balancing technique offers a potential solution to 
monitoring, its principle drawback lies in the fact that it potentially 
penalizes those firms abating at the optimal level. 
Rank order tournaments (ROTs) provide a solution to both complete 
monitoring and random penalization problems. Paper III provided a 
framework to compare a Pigouvian tax or subsidy with the rank order 
tournaments. It showed that in case of risk neutral firms, rank order 
tournament can be designed to yield the same efficiency conditions as that 
of Pigouvian tax, even when the investment to abatement transformation is 
nonlinear still. Either a fixed reward scheme or a flexible penalty scheme 
can be employed to induce optimal investment. The fixed reward scheme is 
budget balancing in the sense that it redistributes the increased welfare 
created by pollution abatement back to the firms, whereas, the flexible 
penalty scheme is not budget balancing. An advantage of flexible penalty 
scheme is that the incentives for collusion among the firms are reduced due 
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to the dependence of the size of the penalties on the level of pollution 
abatement. It should be noted that, however, the flexible penalty scheme 
is not budget balancing and may be subject to moral hazard problem on the 
part of the regulator. The paper analyzed the two key conditions under 
which ROTs may lead to suboptimal allocation of resources: (1) mistakes due 
to the error term, (2) heterogeneous firms. The results show that the 
probability of misranking with ROTs decreases as the deviation between the 
firm's investment increases and as the slope of the transformation function 
becomes steeper. In the case of soil erosion, the paper demonstrates that 
ROTs provide a potentially useful compromise between the complete 
monitoring required for environmental bonds and the random penalization 
method. Using the example of groundwater contamination, the paper 
demonstrated that in the absence of observable good proxies, ROTs do not 
have any advantages over the Plgouvlan tax scheme. Although, ROTs are not 
universally applicable, they should be considered seriously as an 
alternative tool to control environmental pollution problems. 
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